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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Learning and Asset Pricing
By
Michael Shin
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Professor William Branch, Chair
The rational expectations (RE) hypothesis although elegant and useful requires demanding
assumptions on part of the agent. A key outcome of the RE hypothesis is that beliefs disap-
pear as an independent force in the model. A branch of the literature focuses on relaxations
of the RE hypothesis to allow agents to instead learn the data-generating process (DGP)
over time. With adaptive learning, beliefs re-emerge as a key element that influences the
DGP. I argue that this relaxation is important for asset pricing settings, which are complex
environments where individual beliefs play a key role in decision making. My dissertation
will explore instances where learning can improve our understanding of asset pricing.
Chapter 1 presents a simple asset pricing model with endogenous participation that
can match key volatility moments when agents adaptively learn about both the risk and the
return of stocks. With learning about risk, excess volatility of prices is driven by fluctuations
in the participation rate that arise because agents’ risk estimates vary with prices. I find
that learning about risk is quantitatively more important than learning about returns. A
calibrated model can jointly match the mean participation rate, the volatility of participa-
tion rates, and explain 25% of the excess volatility of stock prices observed in U.S. data.
Chapter 2 presents a simplified version of the model in Chapter 1 and tests the model
in a laboratory setting. Recent evidence suggests subjective returns play a key role in stock
market participation. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that stock market experiences,
x
i.e. realized returns, impact subjective returns. I bring a model into the laboratory and
find that learning-driven subjective returns can explain limited participation. Stock market
participation is increasing in both subjective returns and past realized returns. I find di-
rect evidence that “learning from experience” generates heterogeneity in subjective returns,
where subjects who experience low returns have lower subjective returns than subjects who
experience high returns. In particular, subjects over-weigh price trends when they experi-
ence high returns and under-weigh it when they experience low returns.
Chapter 3 presents an asset pricing model where agents test the specification of their
models, while adaptively updating the parameters and find that restricted-perceptions equi-
libria (RPE) naturally arise. I extend upon recently developed model specification techniques
to a multi-agent framework. Multiple agents are endowed with different models which they
update and test the specification in real time. When a model is rejected, agents draw a new
model from a distribution. I find that the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is not
locally stable with respect to hypothesis testing under reasonable parameterization. With
constant-gain learning, the model spends most of its time in a subset of the RPE and in
particular, the dominant model used is not the fully-specified model, but a misspecified one.
xi
Chapter 1
Endogenous Participation, Risk, and
Learning in the Stock Market
1.1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that in 1984 only 27.6% of households
in the PSID participated in the stock market. This “participation puzzle” is at odds with
standard assumptions in asset pricing models. Subsequent studies demonstrate that limited
participation is robust across time periods, asset classes, direct/indirect holdings, and coun-
tries (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2002, Guiso and Jappelli 2002, Campbell 2006).
This paper focuses on the dynamic relationship between participation and asset prices.
Table 1.1, taken from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), documents
fluctuations in participation rates over time with a low of 19.6% and a high of 29.4%. More
recently, Arrondel et al (2014) provide structural econometric evidence of a causal relation-
ship between expected returns and participation rates. I propose a theory of endogenous
fluctuations in participation rates and demonstrate that it can be an important driver of
1
stock price volatility.
Year Participation Rate (%)
1995 20.7
1998 27.1
2000 27.1
2002 29.4
2004 26.4
2005 25.1
2009 21.8
2010 20.4
2011 19.6
2013 20.0
Table 1.1: Stock Market Participation Rates from 1995 - 2013. Data was extracted from the
Survey of Income Program and Participation.
I present a mean-variance asset pricing model with two key departures: a costly par-
ticipation margin and imperfect knowledge about the stochastic processes driving prices.
Participation is costly and agents choose to participate in the stock market by balancing
entry costs against the risk-adjusted expected return from participating. I relax the rational
expectations (RE) assumption and instead assume that agents behave like good econometri-
cians who formulate and estimate a well-specified forecasting model for future stock prices.
A key assumption is that agents have to also estimate the risk, i.e. the conditional variance
of returns. Learning about the risk and return provides two different feedback mechanisms
that contribute to price fluctuations with learning about risk being quantitatively more im-
portant. I find that with learning, changes in agents’ risk estimates lead to large fluctuations
in the participation rate which in turn lead to large fluctuations in the price.
2
To introduce endogenous fluctuations in participation, I implement a cost function
which captures features beyond fixed participation costs while keeping the model tractable.
This approach is motivated by recent empirical evidence revealing costs to participate in the
stock market that go beyond fixed entry costs such as financial awareness, financial literacy,
and other cognition costs (Guiso and Sodini 2013). Similar to labor-leisure decisions, I model
participation as the result of costly effort. Individuals who exert more effort are more likely
to enter the stock market.
It is well known that asset pricing models with RE have difficulty generating excess
volatility (Timmermann 1993). RE requires subjective beliefs to align with the objective
measured probability distribution that is implied by those beliefs. Therefore with RE, be-
liefs disappear as an independent force driving prices, volatility, and participation. I argue
that belief-driven learning dynamics are key in explaining the interplay between participa-
tion and stock price volatility. Hence I take a step down from RE and implement an adaptive
learning rule.
I first characterize the steady-state equilibrium and do comparative statics which give
insights on participation without learning. I find that limited participation lowers the steady-
state price because fewer agents participating in the market corresponds to lower market
demand for the asset. In the steady-state, changes in the structural parameters shift both
the asset demand and participation decision. Therefore, the participation decision can either
shift in the same direction as the asset demand, amplifying the effect on prices, or in the op-
posite direction and reduce the effect. For instance, a decrease in the risk-free rate increases
the demand for the risky asset which increases the price but also increases the participation
rate which leads to a further increase in the price.
I then study the learning dynamics while keeping risk constant in order to character-
ize the learning about returns channel. Along a temporary equilibrium path, agents exert
effort to participate in the stock market, where the level of effort depends on return expec-
tations. Additionally, participation has a direct effect on asset prices and returns. When
3
prices increase, expected returns decrease, leading to a decrease in participation which in
turn decreases prices. This feedback loop due to learning about returns is an important
mechanism in our model for explaining limited participation and excess volatility of stock
prices.
The role for learning about risk is motivated by survey responses in Arrondel et al
(2014) who find that 20.7% of nonparticipants did not invest in the stock market due to the
perceived riskiness of stocks. Since risk influences participation, risk itself is an equilibrium
object jointly determined along with prices and returns. I follow the approach in Branch
and Evans (2011) by explicitly calculating the conditional variance of returns. Risk affects
participation because higher risk lowers returns in certain states and hence lowers the ex-
pected utility from participation. An increase in the subjective risk leads to a decrease in the
participation rate which leads to a decrease in the price. Furthermore a decrease in prices
increases realized returns which leads to an increase in the subjective risk which further
decreases the participation rate. This process continues until risk estimates are adjusted and
the mechanism moves in the opposite direction. This feedback mechanism due to learning
about risk, is key to generating more volatility in prices than the model with exogenous risk.
I also find that learning about risk is quantitatively more important than learning
about returns. Learning about risk generates larger volatility in participation rates which
directly contributes to larger volatility in prices. Essentially, learning about risk is more
important for volatility because changes in risk have a persistent impact on prices. There is
a self-fulfilling aspect between prices and risk which is amplified by the participation mar-
gin. As agents learn about the risk and subjective risk increases, participation decreases and
prices decrease as well. In this sense, higher risk leads to persistently lower prices leading to
higher price volatility. In contrast, prices and expected returns have a negative relationship
such that higher prices lead to lower expected returns which lowers participation. Hence
with learning about returns, higher prices are offset by lower expected returns leading to
lower persistence in volatility. A quantitative exercise demonstrates that the model with
4
learning about risk can match the mean participation rate, the volatility of participation
rates, and generate 25% of the excess volatility in stock prices.
1.1.1 Literature Review
This paper contributes primarily to two literatures. First, to the literature on limited partic-
ipation and household finance. There is a large literature on exogenous limited participation
such as Guo (2004), Guvenen (2009), and Lansing (2015). The first paper to endogenize
limited participation is Allen and Gale (1994) who implement fixed costs in a one-shot asset
pricing game. They find that endogenous participation can increase the volatility of asset
prices. This paper is most similar to Orosel (1998), who models endogenous participation in
an overlapping generations model with fixed costs. My model differs from theirs by imple-
menting a variable cost function, which allows us to tractably analyze the dynamics of the
model while also mapping participation rates to the data. Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
and Fagereng et al (2017) implement fixed costs in a life-cycle model and calibrate it. Models
in this strand of the literature focus on matching the cross-section of asset holdings. In con-
trast, I focus on aggregate participation and how it jointly impacts asset prices and expected
returns in the time-series.
Second, I contribute to the literature on learning. This paper follows a strand of lit-
erature put forth by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) which
relaxes the RE hypothesis and replaces it with an econometric learning rule. The first paper
to analyze learning in an asset pricing model is Timmermann (1993) who shows that adap-
tive learning can generate excess volatility. Our environment is similar to Branch and Evans
(2011) who calibrate a mean-variance asset pricing model where agents also learn about the
risk. We differ from their approach by adding a participation decision and focus on price
volatility rather than asset bubbles. More recently, Nakov and Nun˜o (2015) calibrate an as-
set pricing model with learning and Blanchard-Yaari households. Finally Adam et al (2016)
5
formally test a consumption asset pricing model with learning. As far as I know this is the
first paper to combine an asset pricing model with endogenous participation and learning.
1.2 Model
Time is measured in discrete periods t = 1, 2, ... and there are overlapping generations of
agents who live for 2 periods. All agents have CARA utility functions of the form: u(c) =
−e−ρc, where ρ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. There is one non-storable
consumption good which is taken as the numeraire. There are two assets traded in perfectly
competitive markets: a risky Lucas tree and a riskless one-period bond. Like Lucas (1978),
shares underlie firms that produce exogenous stochastic output of the consumption good.
Participation in the risky market requires effort and none is required in the riskless market.
The riskless one-period bond as an analogue to a savings account or a storage technology.
In reality, participation in the bond market also requires effort but the cost is presumably
lower. I assume that the riskless asset gives an exogenous gross return R = 1 + r > 1 of the
consumption good and the supply is infinitely elastic.
The initial old are endowed with S > 0 shares, where each share pays at the beginning
of the period a dividend Dt. Dt follows an exogenous process:
Dt = µ+ 
D
t
where µ > 0 and Dt is white noise with distribution N(0, σ
2
D). The dividend process is
simplistic for technical convenience and to clearly focus on the participation channel.1 After
1In order to focus on the interactions between learning and participation, I abstract from seriously mod-
eling dividends and asset supply, both of which are better approximated by persistent or non-stationary
processes.
6
the initial old is endowed with the shares, subsequent S follow an exogenous process:
St = S + 
S
t
(1.1)
where St is white noise with distribution N(0, σ
2
S). The stochastic supply is a proxy for
volatility in asset float where firms create new issues and provide options that are periodically
exercised changing the available supply at a given time. Furthermore, the impact of asset
float is well documented in the literature (Baker and Wurgler 2000).
I follow Branch and Evans (2011) who show that in a similar model, stochastic variation
in the population of young agents can produce shocks in per capita asset supply. At the
beginning of each period, a new generation nt enters the economy, where nt is an iid random
process with an inverse mean of one. Because nt is random, the per capita asset supply St is
also random, and follows the stochastic process in Equation (1.1). Each agent lives for two
periods, has initial endowment w normalized to 1, and consumes only in the second period.
This is to abstract away from savings decisions in order to focus entirely on the lifetime
portfolio choice and the stock market entry decision of the young households.
There are costs to participate in the stock market beyond fixed entry costs such as
investing in financial literacy, financial awareness, and other cognition costs (Guiso and
Sodini 2013). I implement a cost function that captures these features while also keeping
the model tractable. Agents can exert up to one unit of effort e. Similar to labor-leisure
decisions, exerting effort is assumed to be costly in terms of utility. Agents face a variable
cost function Φ(e) that is increasing in their effort at a decreasing rate with Φ(0) = 0, and
Φ′(0) = 0.
An iid random variable χ which takes on values 0 and 1 determines the young’s ability
to participate. When χ = 1, the young can participate in the stock market, else they are
unable to enter. Furthermore, the young can influence the likelihood of χ by exerting effort.
If the agent exerts e = 1, then he enters the market with certainty. Similarly, if the agent
7
exerts e = 1
2
, then he enters the market with probability 1
2
. Implicitly, agents who exert
more effort are more likely to increase their financial awareness or invest in financial literacy
and hence are more likely to enter the stock market.
My modeling approach is similar to employment lotteries in labor models following a
technique pioneered by Rogerson (1988). Since entering the stock market is an indivisible
choice, households can improve their welfare by drawing lotteries amongst themselves and
enter the market probabilistically. A natural interpretation, following Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2011), is that this formulation is equivalent to choosing a portion of your lifetime in which
to enter the stock market. Hence e can alternatively be interpreted as the fraction of an
agent’s life in which they would like to participate in the stock market.2 Because of the Law
of Large Numbers, e also corresponds to the aggregate participation rate.
1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Portfolio Choice
Consumption depends on whether the household is a stock market participant. Hence ct =
cχt, where cχt is state-contingent consumption. Let c0t be risk-free consumption and c1t be
risky consumption. Then agents maximize the following program:
maximize
xt(χ),et
(1− et)u(c0t) + etEtu(c1t)− Φ(et)
subject to cχt =

R + xt(pt+1 +Dt+1 −Rpt) if χ = 1
R if χ = 0
(1.2)
2Their exact interpretation is in terms of the labor market in which agents choose their career lengths.
Alternatively, one can imagine agents having a distribution of fixed entry costs and the representative agent
being a stand-in for the heterogeneity. This interpretation is similar in spirit to Orosel (1998).
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where xt is the asset holding decision and pt is the price of the risky asset.
I make a timing assumption on the portfolio and participation decision. In particular,
I assume that the decisions are made sequentially, that is, agents make the participation
decision before the portfolio decision. Equation (1.2) is the agent’s budget constraint. Agents
allocate their endowment between the risky asset and the one-period bond. Agents choose
some portfolio xt and effort level et to maximize their lifetime utility. Furthermore, agents
also assume that the payoffs, pt+1 + Dt+1, are normally distributed, which implies c1t is
also normally distributed. Since the utility is CARA, I arrive at the following first-order
conditions:
xt =
Et(pt+1 +Dt+1)−Rpt
ρσ2p
(1.3)
Φ′(et) = max{Etu(c1t)− u(c0t), 0} (1.4)
where σ2p ≡ V art(pt+1+Dt+1) is the conditional variance of returns, i.e. the agents’ subjective
measure of risk. For now σ2p is treated as a constant but will be made endogenous in
subsequent sections. The inverse function is:
et = min{Φ′−1[Etu(c1t)− u(c0t)], 1} (1.5)
Equation (1.3) is the standard mean-variance asset demand function which is downward
sloping in the price and Equation (1.5) is the participation decision. Hence, the agent’s
optimal effort level depends on equating the expected utility difference of entering and not
entering with the marginal cost of entry.
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1.3.2 Steady-State
To better understand the participation decision, it is illustrative to analyze the steady-state.
I assume a particular form for the cost function:
Φ(et) =
1
2A
e2t , where A > 0 is some technology or efficiency parameter.
Then the inverse of the derivative is:
et = Φ
′−1(y) = Ay, where y ≥ 0 is some input.
Taking the first-order condition I now get:
et = min{AΓ(Etpt, Etpt+1), 1} (1.6)
where:
Γ(Etpt, Etpt+1) = e
−ρR − e−ρR−
[Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−REtpt]2
2σ2p (1.7)
Equation (1.7) follows from the transformation of an exponential function with respect to
normal random variables and is derived in Appendix A. Γ(p) is the expected utility difference
between the two states which can be interpreted as the expected excess utility return of
entering the stock market. Since the participation decision is made prior to the portfolio
decision, there is an Et on the price pt. Thus agents care about the expected price Etpt when
participating. The market-clearing condition is as follows:
etxt = St
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Once I impose market-clearing, I get the following pricing equation:
pt = R
−1
[
Et(pt+1 +Dt+1)− St
et
ρσ2p
]
(1.8)
This is the same as the standard mean-variance pricing equation except now the price also de-
pends on et, where again, et is the participation rate. When et = 1, the model collapses to the
standard mean-variance case. Otherwise, when et < 1, the limited participation steady-state
price will be lower than the corresponding full participation price. Since market-clearing im-
plies prices must be positive, the participation rate et will always be positive in equilibrium
and hence Equation (1.8) is well-defined.
There are two propagation mechanisms with the addition of the participation deci-
sion. The first mechanism is through Etpt+1. In the standard model, Etpt+1 affects the price
directly, but in our model it also impacts it indirectly through et since the participation
decision now depends on expected prices. Second, as et increases, pt increases. In particular,
lower participation rates lead to lower prices and higher participation rates lead to higher
prices. This means that increases in expected prices further increase the price through the
participation channel. Thus I can view et as an amplification mechanism, where changes in
participation rates are demand shocks.
These two effects interact nonlinearly. In order to build intuition about the partici-
pation channel, I look at the steady-state equilibrium. I find the participation channel can
act as both an amplification and dampening mechanism. For instance, an increase in R
decreases both the price through the asset demand and through the participation channel.
In contrast, an increase in the risk σ2p decreases the price through the asset demand but
increases it through the participation channel.
I characterize the steady-state equilibrium where St = S and pt+1 = pt = p¯. Once I
11
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Figure 1.1: Steady-state Equilibrium.
solve for the steady-state I get the following form:
x¯ =
µ− (R− 1)p¯
ρσ2p
Plugging in for the cost function I get the following participation equation:
e¯ = min{AΓ(p¯), 1}
where:
Γ(p¯) = e−ρR − e−ρR−
[µ−(R−1)p¯]2
2σ2p
Proposition 1. There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium.
Proofs are provided in Appendix A. Figure 1.1 depicts Proposition 1 graphically for a
set of parameters. Given that the steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique, I derive the
expression for the steady-state price. I also compare it to the standard mean-variance case.
The steady-state equation for the price in the standard mean-variance model is as follows:
p¯ =
µ− Sρσ2p
R− 1 (1.9)
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Figure 1.2: Steady-state Equilibrium: Limited and Full Participation.
The steady-state equation for my model is:
p¯ =
µ− S
e¯
ρσ2p
R− 1 (1.10)
where:
e¯ = min{AΓ(p¯), 1}
When e¯ = 1, the model again collapses to the full participation case. Since e¯ is decreasing
in p¯, our steady-state price will be lower than the benchmark. I graph Equations (1.9) and
(1.10) in Figure 1.2 to describe the relationship between the two models.
In Figure 1.2, we see that the full participation model has a higher steady-state price
than with limited participation. Another thing to note is that changes in the structural
parameters shift both functions so the magnitude of the change is different than the bench-
mark. Moreover, I can plug Equation (1.10) into the steady-state participation function to
find e¯ as an implicit function of the fundamentals:
e¯ = min{Ae−ρR − Ae−ρR−
S2ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 , 1}
I now sign the derivatives for the steady-state participation and pricing functions.
Proposition 2. For e¯ < 1, the derivative signs for steady-state participation are as follows:
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∂e¯
∂R
< 0, ∂e¯
∂µ
= 0, ∂e¯
∂A
> 0, ∂e¯
∂σ2p
> 0, and ∂e¯
∂ρ
is indeterminate.
Proposition 3. The derivative signs for steady-state price are as follows: ∂p¯
∂R
< 0, ∂p¯
∂µ
> 0,
∂p¯
∂A
> 0, ∂p¯
∂σ2p
< 0, and ∂p¯
∂ρ
is indeterminate.
With endogenous participation, the participation and asset demand functions need not
move in the same direction. For instance, when dividends µ increase, prices increase because
agents increase their asset demand but the steady-state participation rate is unchanged. In
Equation (1.10), we see before the substitution that steady-state participation is a function
of µ. Nevertheless the increase in µ increases participation but this effect is exactly offset by
the increase in prices. When the interest rate R increases, agents lower their asset holdings
which decreases the price. They also decrease participation since the risk-free rate now gives
a higher return which decreases their expected utility gain from investing, further decreasing
the price. Next, an increase in the cost parameter A lowers the cost of participating, which
increases participation and increases the price.
Furthermore, when the risk σ2p increases, agents lower their asset holdings which lowers
the price but their participation rate increases. Similar to the change in µ, there are counter-
balancing effects and the intuition is as follows. For the individual agent, participation is
decreasing in σ2p because it decreases their expected utility gain from investing. Participation
is also increasing as steady-state price goes down. In equilibrium, the price effect dominates
and steady-state participation is increasing in σ2p. Finally, when agents become more risk
averse, they decrease their asset holdings and price decreases. The participation decision now
has a u-shaped relationship with respect to ρ. Participation is increasing in ρ up to some
threshold value, and then decreasing afterwards. This threshold depends on the risk-free rate
being sufficiently high. If the risk-free rate is high enough, then participation is increasing
in ρ. This is because in the steady-state, participation is decreasing in prices because higher
prices lower returns. Hence, a change in the price due to the asset demand can be partially
dampened by the participation effect, but the change in prices is indeterminate.
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I now elaborate on the intuition behind the risk σ2p comparative statics since it plays
a key role in our model. In the steady-state, an increase in σ2p makes the asset riskier to
hold, but prices become low enough such that the equilibrium level of participation will be
higher. Out of steady-state, the price effect only dominates when Etpt+1 approaches p¯. With
learning, the effect of an increase in σ2p will decrease participation which will be the main
driver of volatility in prices. Hence to understand the dynamic relationship between risk and
participation, it is important to analyze the learning dynamics.
1.4 Asset Pricing Dynamics with Learning
Because the stochastic model is a complicated non-linear rational expectations equation, it
is not possible to characterize the full set of rational expectations equilibria (REE). However,
since the unique steady-state is locally determinate, I am able to solve for one type of REE,
the noisy steady-state REE. The noisy steady-state REE is a non-linear REE where the
equilibrium path is a sequence of noisy deviations around the steady-state. I characterize
the noisy steady-state REE and then analyze its stability under learning. I do this by
first taking the risk σ2p as exogenous to clearly understand the dynamic properties of the
participation decision. I then analyze the numerical properties when σ2p is endogenous.
1.4.1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
I start by characterizing the noisy steady-state REE with exogenous risk. The key equation
in the model is the following expectational difference equation:
pt = R
−1
[
Etpt+1 + µ− St
et
ρσ2p
]
(1.11)
Definition 1. A noisy steady-state REE is a sequence {pt}∞t=0 and {St }∞t=0 such that the
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sequences solve the equation:
p(St ) = R
−1
[
Etp(
S
t+1) + µ−
S
e(Etp(St+1), p(
S
t ))
ρσ2p −
St
e(Etp(St+1), p(
S
t ))
ρσ2p
]
(1.12)
where:
e = min {Ae−ρR − Ae−ρR−
[Etp(St+1)+µ−REtp(St )]
2
2σ2p , 1}
Hence the noisy steady-state is characterized by a function p(St ) that solves Equation (1.12).
Since Etp(
S
t+1) = Etp(
S
t ), given that 
S
t is iid:
e = min {Ae−ρR − Ae−ρR−
[µ−(R−1)Etp(St+1)]
2
2σ2p , 1}
Then:
p(St ) = R
−1
[
Etp(
S
t+1) + µ−
S
e(St )
ρσ2p −
St
e(St )
]
Since St is white noise, Etp is a constant and coincides with the nonstochastic steady-state
p¯. Then e becomes:
e = min {Ae−ρR − Ae−ρR−
[µ−(R−1)p¯]2
2σ2p , 1}
which is just e = e¯. Then
pt = p¯+ ηt (1.13)
where ηt ≡ −R−1
[
St
e¯
ρσ2p
]
. I use a proposition by Evans and Honkapohja (1995) that proves
that the noisy steady-state REE exists and is unique.
Proposition 4. If the sequence of shocks {St }∞t=0 are such that |St | < α with probability 1
for all t and α > 0 is sufficiently small, then there exists a unique noisy steady-state REE.
Proposition 4 states that Equation (1.13) is the unique noisy steady-state REE solution to
Equation (1.12). Here α characterizes the support of the distribution of shocks. Essentially,
the idea of a noisy steady-state REE is that when shocks are iid with compact support, there
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exists a stochastic equilibrium in a neighborhood around the steady-state. Hence I have fully
characterized the noisy steady-state REE of our model and now I implement learning.
In practice, the α parameter which characterizes the support of the distribution is
difficult to pin down. Although Proposition 4 states that the distribution exists, it provides
no analytical solution for α. Thus, when doing my numerical simulation I use empirical
moments and robustness checks to insure that the system is locally stable.
1.4.2 Endogenous Risk
I have treated the risk σ2p as a constant. Importantly, σ
2
p is an equilibrium object and having
the agents learn about the risk has important implications. In asset markets with agents
who learn over time, risk plays an important role because the perceived riskiness of an asset
can lead to a lower asset demand that leads to lower prices in future periods. I argue that
endogenizing σ2p is crucial for understanding asset markets because we otherwise omit an
important feedback mechanism that influences prices and expectations.
I now endogenize σ2p ≡ V art(pt+1 +Dt+1). Then:
σ2p = Et(pt+1 − Etpt+1 +Dt+1 − µ)2
Solving out and plugging in Equation (1.13) I have:
σ2p = Et(−R−1ρσ2p
St+1
e¯
+ Dt+1)
2
= V art(−R−1ρσ2p
St+1
e¯
+ Dt+1)
=
R−2ρ2(σ2p)
2
e¯2
σ2S + σ
2
D
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Solving for equilibrium risk σ2p leads to:
σ2p =
e¯2 ± e¯√e¯2 − 4R−2ρ2σ2Sσ2D
2R−2ρ2σ2S
(1.14)
Equation (1.14) is identical to Branch and Evans (2011) when e¯ = 1. We see now σ2p is
determined by fundamentals. Importantly, the standard deviation of supply, σ2S now influ-
ences the risk since agents consider the effect of the volatility of shares on the volatility of
returns. There are also two solutions to Equation (1.14) which correspond to low and high
risk steady-states. Branch and Evans (2011) show that the low risk steady-state is unstable
under learning. I find a similar result with our numerical analysis and hence focus on the
low risk steady-state as well.
Moreover we see that both e¯ and σ2p are determined jointly in equilibrium. Unfortu-
nately, because e¯ and σ2p have no closed form, I am unable to provide analytical solutions
for the case with endogenous risk. Instead, I rely on numerical analysis under learning.
1.4.3 Adaptive Learning
Rational expectations (RE) requires a full understanding of the model as well as beliefs of
other agents. In this sense it is a Nash equilibrium, such that coordination between agents
requires strong cognitive and informational assumptions. Instead, many applied economists
estimate econometric forecasting models and adjust the coefficients in light of new data. Here
I adhere to the Cognitive Consistency Principle (Sargent 1993) which requires agents and
econometricians to be on equal footing. In this regard I want to understand how an agent’s
learning mechanism will, in turn, affect the other endogenous variables. With adaptive
learning, agents know the form of the REE but not the true parameters. I make a small
deviation from RE where agents implement a learning rule and run least-squares regressions
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on the perceived pricing function.3
The REE of the model is a constant plus a noise. Then the agents are regressing prices
on a constant and they need to keep track of the regression coefficient each period. I can
rewrite the sample average recursively where expectations formation take the following form:
pet+1 = p
e
t + t
−1[pt−1 − pet ]
where pet is the subjective expectation of prices formed at time t. This type of learning is
called decreasing-gain learning. With decreasing-gain learning, agents estimate the sample
average of prices and adjust their expectations as new data becomes available. If agents
believe they are in a noisy steady-state and that the REE is a constant then pt = at−1 + νt
where νt is the perceived white noise and at is updated recursively. Then, evidently p
e
t =
at−1 = pet+1. Γ(p
e
t+1, p
e
t ) then becomes:
Γ(pet+1) = e
−ρR − e−ρR−
[(1−R)pet+1+µ]2
2σ2p
We say that the REE is locally stable if the model converges to the REE under decreasing-
gain learning. I check the properties of the model with decreasing-gain learning and show
that the REE is in fact stable under learning.
1.4.4 Stability Under Learning
I show analytically that the REE solution is locally stable under learning. To do this I
have to analyze the mapping between the perceived law of motion (PLM) and actual law of
motion (ALM). With econometric learning, agents know the form of the REE but not the
parameters and hence the PLM is the equation that agents believe generate the observed
3I do not assume that agents learn about the dividend process since learning about exogenous processes
provides no feedback. This assumption has no impact on the main results.
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data. The ALM is the true data-generating process given the beliefs of the agents. Local
stability analysis then amounts to understanding the functional relationship between these
two objects and determining the conditions for convergence.
Agents believe they are in a noisy steady-state and know the form of the REE. Then
the PLM is:
pt = a+ νt
where the conditional expectation, E∗t pt+1 = a. Here the asterisk denotes that the conditional
expectation is not fully rational because the agent does not know the true parameter value.
The ALM is then:
pt = R
−1
[
a+ µ− St
et
ρσ2p
]
et = min{Ae−ρR − Ae
−ρR− [(1−R)a+µ]2
2σ2p , 1}
Plugging into the learning rule, I get:
at = at−1 + t−1
[
R−1(at−1 + µ− St
et(at−1)
ρσ2p)− at−1
]
T (a) = R−1
[
at−1 + µ− St
et(at−1)
ρσ2p
]
where T (a) is a T-map which is a function that maps the agent’s PLM to the ALM. Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) show that the T-map can be used to compute local stability using a
concept called E-stability. The E-stability principle states that locally stable rest points of
the ordinary differential equation (ODE):
da
dt
= T (a)− a
will be attainable under least squares learning. E-stability dictates that the “expectational”
stability of a model depends on the signs of the eigenvalues evaluated at the rest point of
the ODE. If all the eigenvalues have negative real parts, then the REE is locally stable. The
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fixed point of the ODE is:
a =
µ− S
e
ρσ2p
R− 1
e = min{Ae−ρR − Ae−ρR−
S2ρσ2p
2e2 , 1}
where (a, e) correspond to the steady-state values. I now state a proposition showing that
the REE is locally stable under decreasing-gain learning.
Proposition 5. If the sequence of shocks {St }∞t=0 are such that |St | < α with probability 1
for all t and α > 0 is sufficiently small, then the noisy steady-state REE is locally stable
under decreasing-gain learning.
Proposition 5 states that if R−1 is less than 1, then the system is E-stable which is satisfied
in our model. In my model R−1 dictates the strength of the expectational feedback since
higher values lead to larger coefficients on the expectations terms. By assumption, R−1 is
always less than 1 since R is greater than 1. Hence the REE is locally stable under learning.
1.4.5 Constant-Gain
So far I have demonstrated the model properties under decreasing-gain learning. In the
simulations I implement constant-gain learning, where agents weigh each observation with
geometrically declining weights. This is appropriate because my application is a perpet-
ual learning environment which is best captured by constant-gain learning. Constant-gain
learning differs from decreasing-gain learning in the sense that agents are not weighing each
observation equally. As γ increases, the agent weighs new evidence higher. I justify this
for three reasons. First, constant-gain learning is a robust learning mechanism and is well-
represented in the data (Malmendier and Nagel 2011, 2015). Second, when agents are worried
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Figure 1.3: Constant-Gain Learning. For 1000 iterations, γ = 0.05, σ2S = 0.435, A = 1.15,
σ2p = 0.46, µ = 1, R = 1.007, ρ = 0.45. Left figure is limited participation, right figure is full
participation.
about structural changes it is optimal to place higher weights on recent observations. Finally,
constant-gain learning converges to a distribution around the REE, so we can still use the
REE as a benchmark. The following is the recursive formulation for constant-gain learning:
pet+1 = p
e
t + γ[pt−1 − pet ], where γ ∈ [0, 1].
Constant-gain learning requires a projection facility to ensure prices remain non-
negative and plays a stabilizing role when the risk in endogenized. I implement a projection
facility by endogenizing the shares, where the endogenous supply of shares is meant to cap-
ture asset float drying up when markets perform poorly. With endogenous supply, shares
follow:
St = {min(S,Φpt)}Vt
where Vt = 1 + 
S
t and Φ =
S
p¯ξ
, where p¯ is the steady-state price and ξ is a fraction between
0 and 1. Here ξ is the fraction of steady-state price at which prices become endogenous.
Figure 1.3 depicts the learning about returns simulation with a constant gain and
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compares them to the full participation case. As we can see, the model with exogenous
risk generates more volatility than the standard model, which is driven mainly by the par-
ticipation channel. The key mechanism when learning about returns is as follows. When
expected returns increase, participation increases. This leads to an increase in the price,
which leads to a decrease in the expected returns which leads to a decrease in participation.
With constant gain learning, this process leads to persistent fluctuations and adjustments in
the learning process which generates more volatility than the standard case.
1.4.6 Learning about Risk
I now implement a learning rule where agents also have to learn about the risk σ2p. The most
natural learning rule for σ2p is one similar to the rule for prices, where agents regress the risk
on a constant.4 Then the learning rule for σ2p is:
σ2p,t+1 = σ
2
p,t + δ[(pt − pet−1 + Dt )2 − σ2p,t] where δ ∈ [0, 1].
where Dt is the dividend shock. As before, there are 2 steady-state solutions for σ
2
p. Although
Branch and Evans (2011) show the high risk steady-state is unstable under learning, it is not
obvious if their results follow with the addition of a participation decision. Since e¯ and σ2p
have no closed-form expression, a complete analytical solution is unavailable. Nevertheless,
I find that the low risk steady-state is numerically stable under learning while the high risk
steady-state is not. Figure 1.4 depicts the simulation with learning about risk.
I find that there is an increase in volatility in this simulation and in particular there
is substantially more fluctuation in the participation rate. The main feedback mechanism
with learning about risk is as follows. An increase in the subjective risk estimate σ2p leads
4Alternatively, one could use different types of learning rules such as an autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (ARCH) model. Branch and Evans (2013) analyze this case and the qualitative results are
similar.
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Figure 1.4: Endogenous Risk. For 1000 iterations, γ1 = 0.05, γ2 = 0.0005, σ
2
S = 0.435,
A = 1.15, σ2D = 0.28, µ = 1, R = 1.007, ρ = 0.45
to a decrease in the participation rate et which feeds back to a decrease in the asset price.
Furthermore, a decrease in price will increase realized returns which leads to a temporary
decrease in the subjective risk which further decrease the participation rate. This process
continues until risk estimates are adjusted and then the mechanism moves in the opposite
direction. The learning about risk feedback mechanism is the key driver of volatility in my
framework.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
In order to keep the model tractable and focus on the interplay between learning, the par-
ticipation channel, and stock prices I made strong simplifying assumptions. Nonetheless, it
is illustrative to calibrate the model to give some measure of quantitative importance to the
participation channel.
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1.5.1 Parameter Values
The parameters are calibrated according to the values in Table 1.2. The risk aversion ρ is
calibrated to a value within the range of studies found in Babcock, Choi, and Feienerman
(1993) at 0.45. The historical average real interest rate in the U.S. is 2.7% so I take the
gross quarterly rate which is R = 1.007. Next the volatility of dividends σ2D is taken from
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter of quarterly real historical stock market dividend data from
1927 to 2017 from Robert Shiller’s database which is 0.28. For mean dividends µ I choose
a value of 1 where the ratio of mean dividends to the standard deviation is sufficiently high
such that the probability of negative dividends is unlikely. The volatility of supply σ2S is
taken from Baker and Wurgler (2000) who estimate the quarterly volatility of shares in the
S&P 500 at 0.435. The gain parameter γ1 is chosen similarly to past studies at 0.05. Branch
and Evans (2006) show that this parameter value is consistent with the data.
Next, I choose the cost parameter A = 1.15 to match the mean participation rate
consistent with the data. Then, the gain for the risk, γ2 is 0.0005 which is calibrated such
that the ratio of gains γ1
γ2
is sufficiently high to insure stability. Branch and Evans (2011) show
that it is important that the gain for the risk be smaller than the gain for expected prices to
insure stability. In particular, if the gain for the returns moves too much, it may be enough
to move the learning path away from the REE. The endogenous share parameter ξ is chosen
conservatively to be 0.3 which means that the shares start to become endogenous when
prices decline to 30% of the fundamental value. Finally, I am interested in the unconditional
moments so I take a long, transient simulation of two million iterations and burn-in the first
one million.
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Parameters Meaning Value Source/Target
ρ Risk Aversion 0.45 Babcock, Choi, Feinerman (1993)
σ2D SD of Dividend 0.28 HP filtered dividend volatility
σ2S SD of Supply 0.435 Baker and Wurgler (2000)
R Real Interest Rate 1.007 Average U.S. Real Interest Rate
γ1 Price Gain 0.05 Branch and Evans (2006)
γ2 Risk Gain 0.0005 No prior reference
ξ Endogenous Supply 0.3 Projection facility
Table 1.2: Parameter Values.
1.5.2 Moments
The moments I am interested in matching are as follows. The quarterly volatility of the HP
filtered log prices from 1927 - 2017 is 0.132. The mean participation rate from the SIPP
participation data from 1995 - 2013 is 0.373 for both direct and indirect stock holdings,
and the volatility of participation rates is 0.008. I do a quarterly interpolation of the stock
market participation data and HP filter it. I stress that this number is a noisy indicator
of the true parameter and that future studies may want to find a more comprehensive way
of measuring the volatility of participation rates. Nevertheless, it proves instructive to see
how the model performs. The mean and standard deviation of annualized excess returns are
1.061 and 0.313. Finally, the autocorrelation of quarterly HP filtered log prices is 0.842.
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Moment No Risk Risk Data
Sd(p) 0.011 0.031 0.132
Mean(e) 0.368 0.37 0.373
Sd(e) 0.004 0.008 0.008
Mean(Re) 1.032 1.032 1.061
Sd(Re) 0.048 0.047 0.313
ρ(p, p−1) 0.625 0.959 0.842
Table 1.3: Moments Table. Sd(·) is the standard deviation, Re is the excess returns, and
ρ(·) is the correlation coefficient.
1.5.3 Results
Table 1.3 documents the calibration results. As we can see, the learning about risk model
does well on many dimensions, particularly when taking into account that the model is
highly stylized. Even with the model abstracting away from serially correlated shocks we
can see that the risk specification can match upwards of 50% of the volatility in stock prices.
That is, as the stock market participation rates go down, stock volatility goes up. That
is because, as participation rates go down, the market becomes more thin and volatility
increases. I also find that learning about risk generates 3 times more volatility than learning
about returns. Therefore, we can attribute most of the volatility from learning about risk
rather than learning about returns. Next I can also match the volatility of participation rates
which is 0.008. In contrast, the model without learning about risk is unable to generate the
necessary volatility in the participation rate and generates a standard deviation of 0.004.
I can also match half of the mean excess returns at 1.032 and I do much better at
matching the autocorrelation of stock prices at 0.959 while without learning about risk, the
autocorrelation is 0.625. I am unable to match the standard deviation of excess returns at
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0.047. I argue that the current model with iid shocks is not a good model for returns. With
iid dividends and autocorrelation of prices, due to learning about risk, prices are moving in
the same direction per period which removes the agents’ capital gains.5
Learning about returns matters but learning about risk is necessary to generate volatil-
ity that matches the magnitudes found in the data. As before, with learning about risk the
key mechanism is as follows. An increase in the subjective risk, decreases the participation
rate which leads to a decrease in the price leading to a decrease in the subjective risk. This
process continues until risk estimates are adjusted and then the mechanism moves in the
opposite direction. These cyclical movements depend on the magnitude of the shocks and
the magnitude of steady-state deviations. As enough data is realized, the process stabilizes
around the steady-state values.
The model mechanism is also externally validated by survey responses provided in
Arrondel et al (2014) where 20.7% of the sample stated the reason they do not invest in the
stock market is that it is too risky. If one takes risk to be the variance of returns as in the
context of our model, then it provides a natural explanation for limited participation rates
and excess volatility in stock prices.
1.6 Conclusion
I have demonstrated that a simple asset pricing model with a participation decision can do
well at matching moments of the data when allowing for agents to adaptively learn about
risk and returns. The model adds a participation channel and endogenizes the risk which
allows feedback effects to occur when combined with expectations and learning. The two
key mechanisms are due to learning about risk and learning about returns. The learning
about returns mechanism works as follows. When expected returns increase, participation
increases, which leads to an increase in the price. This leads to a decrease in the expected
5Suitably extended versions of the model can explain returns such as in Adam et al (2017).
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return and hence decreases participation. Similarly for learning about risk, when expected
risk increases, participation decreases which decreases the price. This leads to a decrease
in the expected returns which further increases the expected risk and hence further lowers
participation. When risk estimates are finally corrected, the feedback mechanism moves in
the opposite direction. The combination of these two channels are what leads to the agent’s
subjective risk being an important driver of stock price volatility, with learning about risk
being quantitatively more important.
Future research will take the quantitative implications seriously by introducing serially
correlated shocks and heterogenous agents. Also a focus of future empirical research will be
to collect and better understand the time-series of participation rates.
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Chapter 2
Expectations and Stock Market
Participation: Theory and Evidence
2.1 Introduction
One of the main stylized facts in household finance is that stock market participation rates are
significantly lower than predicted by standard asset pricing models, the so-called “limited
participation puzzle” (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991). Although transaction costs, incomplete
markets, and liquidity constraints all help explain limited participation, facets of the data
are difficult to reconcile with these explanations (Guiso and Sodini 2013). For example,
within the 80th percentile of the U.S. wealth distribution where a typical household has
$200,000 in financial assets, 20% do not participate in the stock market (Campbell 2006).
Limited participation among the wealthy is difficult to reconcile solely with transaction
costs or liquidity constraints and poses a significant challenge to the theory. More recently,
there is strong empirical evidence that subjective returns are a key determinant of stock
market participation (Hurd et al 2011). In addition, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
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subjective expectations of stock market returns within survey data (Dominitz and Manski
2011). These two facts suggest that differences in subjective expected returns may play an
important role in explaining limited participation among households who are not liquidity
constrained.
While information acquisition is a popular interpretation of differences in subjective
expected returns (Van Nieuwerbaugh and Veldkamp 2010), private information sets are noto-
riously difficult to elicit from the data. In contrast, recent empirical evidence by Malmendier
and Nagel (2011, 2016) demonstrates that “learning from experience”, where households
place greater weight on data that occurs within their lifetime, can generate heterogeneity
in subjective expected returns independent of private information. Thus I provide an al-
ternative interpretation where heterogeneity in subjective expected returns are generated
by a learning process. Taking participation costs as a primitive, I ask to what extent sub-
jective expected returns explain limited participation. The experimental results show that
heterogeneous participation costs with rational expectations (RE) are not enough to explain
limited participation. In addition, heterogeneity in subjective expected returns along with
deviations from RE are needed.
I first write down a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous participation costs
where, depending on the distribution of costs, limited participation is a steady-state out-
come. This allows me to have a framework to understand the mechanisms behind limited
participation. While the most common approach in testing expectations-based models is us-
ing survey data, stock market participation is difficult to test because dynamic participation
data is generally unavailable. In addition, standard surveys like the SCF and PSID do not
elicit subjective expected returns. Moreover, researchers have little to no control over the
subjects’ information sets given that the environment is constantly changing, which is espe-
cially critical in asset pricing. In particular, the data-generating process (DGP) is unknown
to the researcher and important parameters must be calibrated or estimated.
Instead I test the implications of the theory, using the experimental method, which
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provides an ideal tool to analyze models of limited participation. In the experimental labo-
ratory the researcher is able to control the fundamentals of the environment and jointly elicit
expectations along with individual participation data while having complete knowledge of
subjects’ history and information sets. It also provides a tool to test the comparative statics
of limited participation models while analyzing the effects of induced participation costs,
subjective expected returns, and learning on individual participation decisions. Thus, the
laboratory presents an environment to diagnose the causes of potential deviations from the
theory, not identifiable solely using survey data.
Models with forward-looking expectations are inherently difficult to test in the lab-
oratory. Rational expectations requires that agents not only make optimal forecasts, but
optimal decisions conditional on their forecasts. This joint optimization task can prove chal-
lenging for subjects in the laboratory. A learing-to-forecast (LtF) experiment separates these
tasks such that subjects are only asked to forecast stock market prices while the optimiza-
tion decision is done by an automated auctioneer. In particular, subjects are incentivized
based on the accuracy of their forecasts and an automated auctioneer constructs an optimal
portfolio based on the subjects’ forecasts. Hence a LtF experiment allows for a clean way
to elicit individual expectations while preserving the self-referential nature of beliefs and
outcomes.
I extend the standard LtF asset pricing experiment (Hommes et al 2005) to include a
stock market participation decision. Subjects make both a participation decision and forecast
prices in each period. As a preview, I find mixed results for the homogeneous expectations
model with participation costs. While the main predictions of the model do well, where
mean prices and participation rates are generally lower in treatments with higher partic-
ipation costs, subjects with higher induced costs do not necessarily have lower subjective
returns. Moreover, the heterogeneity in subjective returns are more disperse and persistent
than predicted by the benchmark model. Given these results, I analyze the stock market
participation decision directly. I find that while participation is increasing in subjective ex-
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pected returns, contrary to the model, participation also depends on past realized returns.
That is, higher past realized returns from participating increases the likelihood of stock mar-
ket participation.
I next look at a learning-based explanation of the observed heterogeneity in subjective
returns. Since the fundamentals and aggregate variables are common knowledge, hetero-
geneity in subjective expected returns cannot be explained by private information. The
experimental method provides me with a novel tool to look at the subjects’ expectations
updating rule directly. I find strong evidence that subjects update their expectations condi-
tional on realized returns. Contrary to standard learning models, subjects who experience
high returns have higher subjective returns and subjects who experience low returns have
lower subjective returns than subjects who do not participate. In particular, subjects over-
weigh the price trend when experiencing high returns and under-weigh the price trend when
experiencing low returns, with low returns having a stronger quantitative impact. Thus I
find evidence that limited participation can be perpetuated by subjects with low subjective
returns due to low experienced returns.
Finally, my experiment allows for documentation of a novel behavioral phenomena.
I find evidence of “discouraged investors” who exit the stock market for the remainder
of the experiment after receiving consecutive low returns relative to the risk-free return.
This finding provides direct experimental evidence of a behavioral finance phenomena as in
Strahilevitz et al (2011) where investors are reluctant to hold stocks once they realize low
payoffs.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes primarily to three literatures. First, I contribute to the literature on
endogenous participation in asset markets. The phenomenon of limited participation is first
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documented by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). The first paper to endogenize participation in
an asset pricing setting is Allen and Gale (1994). Following Allen and Gale (1994), there
have been numerous extensions such as Orosel (1998), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gomes and
Michaelides (2005), and more recently Shin (2018).
I also contribute to the empirical literature on limited participation, in particular, to
the strand of the literature dealing with subjective returns. Guiso and Sodini (2013) provides
a survey of alternative explanations such as participation costs, trust, and non-standard pref-
erences. Hurd et al (2010) and Arrondel et al (2014) use novel datasets on expectations and
asset positions to estimate a causal effect between subjective expected returns and likelihood
of stock market participation. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) shows that living through a
period of low stock market returns reduces the likelihood of stock market participation. My
paper consolidates these previous findings by establishing the connection between subjective
expected returns, experienced realized returns, and its subsequent effects on stock market
participation.
Second, I contribute to the literature on LtF asset pricing experiments following
Hommes et al (2005). Following the pioneering work of Hommes et al (2005), there have
been numerous extensions. For a survey of the literature see Hommes et al (2011) and Duffy
(2016). A related paper is Hennequin (2018), who analyzes the effects of stock market expe-
riences on bubble formation. My paper differs from theirs in that stock market experiences
are endogenous in my experiment and that I focus on limited participation and not bubbles.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on adaptive learning and asset pricing.
This paper follows a strand of literature put forth by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) which relaxes the RE hypothesis and replaces it with an econometric
learning rule. The first paper to analyze learning in an asset pricing model is Timmermann
(1993) who shows that adaptive learning can generate excess volatility. Branch and Evans
(2010, 2011) use a similar asset pricing model to explain bubbles and crashes and regime-
switching returns. Finally Adam et al (2016) formally test a consumption asset pricing model
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with learning. As far as I know, this paper is the first to explore endogenous participation
in a LtF environment.
2.3 Model
First I describe an asset pricing model with an endogenous participation decision and hetero-
geneous participation costs with the goal of implementing it in the laboratory. This model
provides a framework for understanding the determinants of limited participation in equi-
librium. I then introduce a special case of the model which includes parameterizations and
features of the experimental design.
2.3.1 Endogenous Participation
The benchmark model is a CARA asset pricing model with heterogeneous participation
costs and an endogenous participation decision. In order to map the model to the simplest
laboratory environment, I introduce two agents that make the participation and portfolio
decisions separately. This formulation allows me to get a closed-form solution by making the
participation decision linear in expectations, while keeping the same comparative statics as
the model with one risk-averse agent as in Shin (2018).
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are M households who are each paired
with a financial advisor. Households have CARA utility of the form: uP (ct) = −e−ρct ,
where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and financial advisors are risk-neutral:
uM(ct) = ct. Both households and advisors are 1-period maximizers. There are two assets:
a risk-free 1-period bond which pays a gross return R = 1 + r > 1 and a risky asset with
price pt that pays an ex-ante dividend Dt = µ + 
D
t , where 
D
t ∼ N(0, σ2D). The risk-free
1-period bond is in infinitely elastic supply. The supply of assets is iid with mean S and
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follows St = S + 
S
t , where 
S
t ∼ N(0, σ2S).
To participate in the risky asset market, financial advisors have to pay a research cost
κi which is specific to each advisor i. Here the research cost is a proxy for both financial and
psychological participation costs that are documented in the literature (Guiso and Sodini
2013). The financial advisor makes the participation decision and the household makes a
subsequent portfolio allocation decision. Advisors make a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the total
payoff from the portfolio returns and the household keeps fraction 1− α. I assume that the
advisor and households do not have the technology to change this contract.1
Let Wt+1 = RWt + (1 − α)xit(pt+1 + Dt+1 − Rpt) be the next period’s wealth for the
household, where xit is the fraction of wealth held in the risky asset by household i. CARA
utility insures that optimal asset holdings are independent of wealth such that Wt need not be
indexed by i. I assume that the endowment is sufficiently large that agents are not liquidity
constrained. Since all the random variables are normally distributed and the household has
CARA utility, the maximization problem is:
max
xit
EtWt+1 − ρ
2
VtWt+1
s.t. Wt+1 = RWt + (1− α)xit(pt+1 +Dt+1 −Rpt)
where i denotes household i. If the financial advisor does not participate, then the household
places all their wealth into the riskless bond. Taking the F.O.C.:
xit =
Etpt+1 + µ−Rpt
(1− α)ρσ2p (2.1)
where VtWt+1 ≡ σ2p. Equation (2.1) is the standard mean-variance asset demand adjusted
for α. The participation decision for the advisor is:
max
nit
αxit(Etpt+1 + µ−REtpt)− κi
1α can be microfounded through an optimal contract design.
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where nit is 1 if the advisor decides to participate in the risky asset market and 0 otherwise.
Etpt+1 + µ−REtpt is the expected return from participation for the advisor and αxit is the
fraction of the profits that the advisor makes per share xit. There is an expectation Et on
pt because I assume pt is unknown to the advisor before participating. I rationalize this by
treating the participation decision as a market order where realized prices can be different
from the quoted price during the time of the order. In contrast, the portfolio decision is a
limit book, where agents give the auctioneer an asset position for every price. While this is
reasonable for the portfolio decision, it is unreasonable for the participation decision because
the decisions are made sequentially.
I solve by backward induction, where the advisor takes xit as given. Then the cutoff
decision for the advisor is:
nit =

1 if Etpt+1 + µ−REtpt ≥ b
√
κi
0 else
(2.2)
where b ≡
√
1−α
α
ρσ2p. Notice that the threshold in the participation decision depends posi-
tively on the participation cost, risk aversion, and negatively on the surplus share α. I can
rewrite ki ≡ b
√
κi and call it the effective participation cost for advisor i. The advisor only
cares about the subjective expected returns relative to the participation cost per fraction of
earnings. Thus, I can always rewrite the distribution of costs as a function of bki, where
bki is the per asset cost of participation for advisor i. The optimization problem reduces
to a mean-variance portfolio problem with a risk-neutral participation decision. Again, the
structure of the model maps into the simplest laboratory implementation.
Aggregate participation is Nt =
1
M
∑
i n
i
t which is the fraction Nt ∈ [0, 1] of the pop-
ulation participating in the risky market and aggregate asset holdings is Xt =
∑
M x
i
t.
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Market-clearing NtXt = St implies that the equilibrium pricing equation is:
pt = R
−1
[
1
Nt
∑
N
Etpt+1 + µ− St
Nt
(1− α)ρσ2p
]
(2.3)
where the summation on Etpt+1 is over all stock market participants Nt. Since market-
clearing implies prices must be positive, the participation rate Nt is always positive in equi-
librium and hence Equation (2.3) is well-defined. Given that prices are not defined for
Nt = 0, I utilize an automated mutual fund who always participates during the experiment.
Participation affects prices through two channels. First, only expectations of market
participants are priced so participation endogenously reduces the number of agent’s expec-
tations that are priced. Second, participation affects prices directly through the supply St.
As Nt increases, prices increase. In particular, lower participation rates lead to lower prices
and higher participation rates lead to higher prices. When Nt = 1 the model collapses to the
standard model without a participation decision. Thus, Nt acts as a demand multiplier for
aggregate asset holdings. Because Nt is a decreasing function of Etpt, higher Etpt leads to
lower participation which leads to a lower price. This is because higher Etpt lowers expected
returns in that the advisor expects to pay a higher price to hold the asset. The advisor
always wants to pay the lowest price possible.
Since b is a parameter, for simplicity I set this to 1. I do this so that I can arrive
at a form similar to Hommes et al (2005) but also to analyze the interactions between the
expectational feedback mechanisms directly.
pt = R
−1
[
1
Nt
∑
N
Etpt+1 + µ− St
Nt
]
(2.4)
Although it is standard to analyze the case with S = 0, I analyze the case with S > 0
because it is more interesting to analyze the direct effects of participation especially if we
believe feedback between expectations and prices matter. If S = 0, the participation effects
drop out from Equation (2.4) and participation only indirectly affects prices. I rationalize
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my approach by arguing that in models with reasonable learning rules, if the steady-state
price is a constant, agents can learn the steady-state values (Bao et al 2017). In particular,
any LtF experiment with risk-averse preferences will have to implement a positive supply.2
2.3.2 Steady-state Equilibrium
In order to solve for the steady-state, I specify the distribution of participation costs. I make
the distribution of costs uniform U(0, k¯), where k¯ is the upper support of the distribution
and represents the agent with the highest participation cost. I assume that each agent
can be represented by a point in the distribution, that is, agents are equally spaced along
the distribution and no two agents can have the same cost. Implicitly, I also assume that
one agent has a participation cost of zero. Then I can represent the distribution with a
participation cost function c(Nt) = Ntk¯, where Nt = 1 is full participation and the aggregate
cost of full participation is k¯. c(Nt) is the limiting cost function that arises as the number
of agents M approaches infinity.
Once I specify the cost function, the equilibrium participation rate is characterized
by the marginal agent who is indifferent between participating and not participating. I set
expected returns equal to the cost function c(Nt) = Ntk¯. In the steady-state, pt = pt+1 =
p¯, St = S. Then the steady-state values are:
p¯ =
µ− S
N¯
R− 1
N¯ = min {
√
S
k¯
, 1}
The steady-state is the fundamental price and participation rates that are equilibrium best-
responses with a given cost distribution for all agents. Steady-state participation N¯ depends
on the supply S and the upper support of the cost distribution k¯. The minimum operator
2In Hommes et al (2005) setting S = 0 implements risk neutrality.
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insures that the participation rate is never greater than 1.
The comparative statics are intuitive, higher cost implies that the participation rate
is lower and prices are lower. Higher supply when S ≥ 1 implies that there are more shares
and the participation rate is higher and prices are higher. The key feature of the model is
that higher costs k¯ lead to lower participation rates N¯ because it lowers aggregate demand
for stocks. The specific mechanism is that participation costs ki reduce the expected utility
of participation and acts as a wedge for agents with high costs.
2.3.3 Parameterization
To implement the model in the laboratory, I make three additional assumptions. First, I
make the dividends constant Dt = µ. This has no bearing on the equilibrium but simplifies
the instructions. Second, I normalize S to 1. Finally, I create bounds on the advisor’s excess
returns. That is, advisors can only make pi to p¯i excess returns from participation. This is to
map closely to the experiment where payoffs from stock market participation are bounded
and has no bearing on the model equilibrium since these thresholds are chosen such that it
will not bind in the model. I rationalize my experimental design choices in the subsequent
section. Then the steady-state values become:
p¯ =
µ− N¯−1
R− 1
N¯ = min {
√
k¯−1, 1}
2.3.4 Model Hypotheses
The treatments vary the cost parameter k¯.3 Based on the theory in the last subsection
I present the following hypotheses which are tested in the experiment. The model has a
3I do not vary the supply parameter S since this information is usually not given to the subjects in a LtF
experiment.
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clear implication that subjects with lower participation costs should participate more than
subjects with high participation costs. Any deviations from this behavior must be due to
factors unrelated to participation costs.
Hypothesis 1: Treatments with a higher cost distribution parameter k¯ have lower mean prices
p¯ and participation rates N¯ . In particular, subjects with higher induced participation costs
ki have lower mean participation rates n¯i.
Hypothesis 1 is a direct test of the aggregate properties of the model. Since a higher
cost parameter implies there are more subjects with higher induced participation costs ,
the steady-state participation rate is lower. Similarly, the lower participation rate implies a
lower price since there is lower aggregate demand for the asset in the steady-state.
Hypothesis 2: Participation is increasing in subjective expected returns Eitpt+1 +µ−REitpt−
ki. In particular, participation is an increasing function of the 2-period ahead forecast Eitpt+1
and a decreasing function of the 1-period ahead forecast Eitpt, and induced cost k
i.
Hypothesis 2 falls from the utility function and looks more closely at the individual par-
ticipation decision. Here I allow for subjective expected returns to be subscripted by i as
in Eitpt + µ − REitpt − ki. In the model, subjective expected returns for agent i are in-
creasing in the 2-period ahead forecast and decreasing in the 1-period ahead forecast and
induced participation costs. Thus the model predicts that at the individual level, subjects
with higher subjective returns should be more likely to participate than those with lower
subjective returns.
Hypothesis 3: Under adaptive learning, all subjects update their subjective returns towards
the forecast error and subjective returns converge over time. Heterogeneity in subjective re-
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turns V art(Etpt+1 + µ−REtpt − ki) is due to heterogeneity in costs V ar(ki). Moreover, all
subjects have expected returns Etpt+1 + µ−REtpt net participation costs ki.
Hypothesis 3 investigates the model implications under standard learning mechanisms i.e.
learning processes that update expectations towards the forecasting error. In the benchmark
model, under homogeneous expectations, since all subjects have access to the same history
of aggregate variables, their forecasts can only differ due to their induced participation cost.
With rational expectations (RE), objective and subjective probabilities must be equal so
differences in expectations must be due to differences in their induced costs. With adaptive
expectations, if the underlying rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a constant plus
a noise, then both the 1-period and 2-period ahead forecasts must be equal and subjective
returns should converge to the objective returns.4 In particular, the dispersion of subjective
returns converges to the variance of the induced cost distribution. The strong empirical
evidence on “learning from experience” and the stylized facts on heterogeneous subjective
returns in survey data suggest an alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Subjects’ with higher past returns have higher subjective expected returns
and subjects’ with lower past returns have lower subjective expected returns i.e. subjects up-
date their forecasts differently depending on past payoffs. Heterogeneity in subjective returns
persist over time.
Empirical evidence from survey data along with psychological evidence demonstrates that
agents who experience lower returns expect lower returns and higher returns expect higher
returns. The experiment provides an ideal environment to test this hypothesis since the
economic fundamentals are common knowledge and subject’ information sets are known to
the researcher. Moreover, the introduction of a 1-period ahead forecast elicitation along with
4Shin (2018) demonstrates that in this model, there exists a noisy steady-state REE which is a constant
plus a noise that is E-stable.
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the 2-period ahead forecast, which will be described in detail in the next section, provides a
novel tool for understanding subjects’ expectations updating process.
2.4 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to test Hypotheses 1-3. I utilize a learning-to-forecast (LtF)
design. In a LtF experiment, the experimenter elicits expectations of the subjects while
the optimization decision is done through an automated auctioneer. This provides a clean
way of eliciting expectations without having to deal with the potential complications of the
joint forecasting-optimization task. My experiment differs from the standard design in that
I introduce a simple, binary optimization task in the form of a participation decision.
I implement the model in Section 2.3 in the laboratory. I vary the induced cost distri-
bution k¯ and test the model against a baseline version where I shut down the participation
decision. This allows me to test the comparative statics of the model as well as determinants
of the participation decision. In particular, I implement 4 treatments. The first treatment
tests the benchmark case which is Hommes et al (2005) with the addition of a 1-period ahead
forecast. The rest of the treatments vary the cost parameter k¯ from 0 to 1.5 to 4 which is
a shift in the distribution of participation costs. I conduct 16 sessions with 4 sessions per
treatment. Each session has 8 subjects for a total of 128 subjects.
2.4.1 Experimental Instructions
The experiment was programmed using oTree. The experimental design is a standard LtF
asset pricing experiment with the addition of a stock market participation decision. 8 sub-
jects are told they are advisors to a household.5 Households need advice on whether they
5Originally subjects were advisors to fund managers. The current formulation just changes “fund man-
ager” to “households” within the instructions and changes nothing else in the experimental setting.
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should participate in the stock market along with a forecast of stock prices in each period
(in particular for this period t and the next t+ 1). Subjects are told that the household will
make an optimal portfolio allocation split between stocks and risk-free bonds conditional
on these forecasts and completely follow any participation advice. At the beginning of the
experiment, each subject is randomly given an induced participation cost drawn from a uni-
form distribution without replacement. Subjects are told the distribution U(0, k¯) and the
drawn induced cost ki is fixed throughout the experiment. The units are in francs which is
a common experimental currency.
As is standard in the literature, subjects are only told qualitative information about
the data-generating process. In particular, they are told that higher price forecasts lead to
higher asset purchases and that stock market prices are determined by supply and aggre-
gate demand. They are told that aggregate demand depends on the decisions of the other
households who are also advised by other subjects in the experiment. The exact number of
subjects are not revealed. Moreover, they are also provided with information on the dividend
µ and interest rates R which are also fixed. Subjects are told that there is one pension fund
who always participates in the market. Finally, they are told there is a small, exogenous
demand for stocks by private investors. This is a proxy for the stochastic supply which is
formally equivalent to noise traders in the model.
2.4.2 Pricing Mechanism
The pricing mechanism is generated by Equation (2.4) which is repeated here:
pt = R
−1
[
1
N
∑
i
Eitpt+1 + (1− h(Nt))p¯+ µ−
St
Nt
]
where 1−h(Nt) is the weight placed on the automated fund which depends on the number of
participants in the market and p¯ is the steady-state price implied by the model parameters.
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Stage 1
Forecast pet , p
e
t+1
Stage 2
Participation nit
Stage 3
Portfolio Choice xit
Automated
Figure 2.1: Timeline
The automated pension fund participates every period and forecasts the model implied
fundamental price p¯ to insure prices exist. The automated pension fund plays two roles:
first they insure that prices exist every period. Second they play a stabilizing role given that
they forecast the fundamental price every period.6
2.4.3 Timing and Decisions
There are 50 periods and each period is divided into 3 stages. In the first stage, subjects are
told to make a 1 and 2-period ahead forecast of prices pet , p
e
t+1. p
e
t+1 is called a 2-period ahead
forecast because pt is not revealed until the end of the period thus using an information set
up to period t − 1. I add an upper bound p¯et+1 = 100 similar to past studies to rule out
potential bubbles. In the second stage, subjects are asked to give participation advice nit
to the household to either participate in the stock market or not. At the third stage, all
decisions are given to the automated auctioneer who clears the market. The price pt and
participation rate Nt are then revealed. Throughout the experiment, subjects are provided
with the history of past prices, past participation rates, subject-specific expectations, and
past payoffs. The following timeline shows the sequence of decisions:
It is important to note that my experiment makes two deviations from the standard
LtF design. First, subjects are asked to make a participation decision in the form of advice
to households. Second, subjects are asked to make a 1-period ahead forecast along with their
2-period ahead forecast. This is because the profits from participating in the stock market
6Hommes et al (2005) also have a stabilizing fund and show that removing it has no qualitative impact
on their results.
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Figure 2.2: Experimental Screen: Forecasting Prices
depend on their realized returns which depends on pt which is unknown to the subjects when
making the participation decision. To make an informed decision, subjects must also make
a forecast of the 1-period ahead price. I also provide subjects with their subjective expected
returns pet+1 +µ−Rpet conditional on their forecasts along with their previous forecast of pet .
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide screens of the experiment for the forecasting and participation
decisions.
2.4.4 Parameterization
I follow Hommes et al (2005) and choose the experimental parameters as follows: the mean
dividend µ = 3, the gross interest rate R = 1.05, and the standard deviation of the supply
shock σ2S = 0.25. For simplicity, I set the supply S = 1 which acts as a natural benchmark
normalization but future studies can explore what happens when you vary S. In Treatment
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Figure 2.3: Experimental Screen: Participation Decision
2, all subjects have an induced participation cost ki of zero which corresponds to k¯ = 0. The
steady-state price in this case is p¯ = 40. Treatments 3 and 4 have cost parameters at k¯ = 1.5
and 4 respectively which lead to N¯ = 0.82 and 0.5 and p¯ = 35.5 and 20.
With 8 subjects and 1 automated fund, this implies steady-state participation is 6-7
subjects participating in Treatment 3 and 4-5 subjects participating in Treatment 4. The
predictions are in between because the discrete nature of the experiment leads to steady-state
predictions that are fractions. The cost parameters were chosen such that there is sufficient
variation within steady-state participation rates while the steady-state price is sufficiently
away from 50 since the average initial guess tends to be around 50. Table 2.1 shows the
parameterization.
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Parameter Meaning Value
µ mean dividend 3
R gross interest rate 1.05
σ2S supply shock 0.25
S supply 1
k¯ cost distribution 0 to 4
Table 2.1: Experimental Parameters
2.4.5 Payoffs
The conversion rate in the experiment is 15 points = $1. The rate was determined through
pilot studies to insure sufficient compensation for subjects’ time. Subjects are paid according
to two criteria: forecasting accuracy and the 1-period return from participating in the stock
market. Forecasting payoffs are given by the following equation:
pift =
16
2 + |pt − pet,t−1|+ |pt − pet,t| (2.5)
where pet,t−1 is the 2-period ahead forecast of price pt made in period t − 1 and pet,t is the
1-period ahead forecast of price pt made at the beginning of period t. Thus subjects are paid
based on the accuracy of both their forecasts to insure truthful revelation. Equation 2.5 is
an adjusted Brier score with sharp declining payoffs to avoid the flat maximization problem
(Camerer 2003). In particular, if the payoff function is sufficiently flat such that differences
from the optimum only lead to small changes in the payoffs, then the payoff function may
not be sufficient to induce truthful revelation. The maximum payoff subjects can make per
period from forecasting is 8 points and sharply declines with the forecast error.
Participation payoffs are given by:
pipi,t =

min{5, 3 +MP} if nit−1 = 1 and pt + µ−Rpt−1 − ki ≥ 0
max{1, 3 +MP} if nit−1 = 1 and pt + µ−Rpt−1 − ki ≤ 0
3 if no participation nit=1 = 0
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where MP = pt + µ − Rpt−1 − ki is the net 1-period return and nit−1 is the participation
decision where nit−1 = 1 is to participate in the stock market. Hence, if there is positive profit
from participation, subjects make a high payoff up to 5, else they make a low payoff down
to 1, which is linear in realized returns. Subjects can also take the risk-free option which is
chosen in between the high and low payoffs at 3. Notice that participation payoffs depend on
subjects’ participation decision in period t− 1. This is because the 1-period return depends
on the realization of next period’s prices. The payoffs are incentive compatible because since
subjects’ subjective expected returns are their best forecasts, risk-neutral subjects can do
no better than participating if it is positive and not participating otherwise. In equilibrium,
subjects with high participation costs will lose payoff in expectation.
I now rationalize my experimental design choices. With unbounded payoffs, the maxi-
mum payoff would be 103 and the minimum would be -98 because MP = pt+µ−Rpt−1−ki.
Thus, to make participation payoffs comparable to forecasting payoffs, I chose to bound them
at a level similar to the forecasting payoffs. In particular, I ran a pilot study to see what
average forecasting payoffs were. If one task gives more payoff on average than the other,
then subjects have an incentive to pay more attention to one task. I choose the loss and gain
thresholds to be symmetric such that the expected payoff from participation are symmetric.
If there is more downside risk then there may be over-participation independent of the model
since subjects can potentially gain much more from participating than not. Future studies
can explore the effects of changing the threshold payments.
Next, I choose to place cutoffs on the payments rather than give subjects an endow-
ment due to potential wealth effects. Of course, since my model removes wealth effects from
consideration, I take the interpretation from Crockett et al (2018) that subjects may bring
intrinsic utility to the laboratory that differs from induced utility. Thus to avoid potential
complications, I remove wealth effects from consideration. Future studies can explore the
implications of adding endowments with unbounded payoffs.
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2.4.6 Subjects and Payments
Subjects are undergraduate students from the University of California, Irvine. As part of the
instructions, each subject is required to complete a quiz to test comprehension. Instructions
are reproduced in the appendix. Subjects are recruited for two and a half hour sessions but a
typical session lasts two hours, including instructions and the quiz. Treatment 1 lasts around
1 hour and 45 minutes on average because it includes no participation stage. At the end of
the last round and before the realization of payoffs, subjects are given a risk elicitation task
which takes around 10 minutes. This is to insure that priming does not play a role in the
risk elicitation.
Payoffs are earned from every period for each task. One task is selected at random
at the end of the experiment and subjects are given points for that task. Random selection
helps insure that subjects pay equal attention to both tasks. The mean payment was $18.49
including the show-up payment of $7. The average payment for the risk elicitation was $2.21.
2.4.7 Risk Elicitation
I elicit risk aversion using a multiple-price list (MPL) as in Drichoutis and Lusk (2016). A
MPL provides a list of safe and risky lotteries to subjects and asks them to choose between
them. After the survey, the experimenter utilizes a randomization device and one lottery on
the list is played. Subjects receive a payment based on their choice for that lottery. The
number of safe choices provides an estimate of their risk aversion parameter. Csermely and
Rabas (2016) shows that the most reliable risk elicitation surveys are in the form proposed
by Drichoutis and Lusk (2016).7
7Their criterion was based on predictability and consistency. For more details please see their paper.
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Treatment Cost Parameter S.S. Price S.S. Participation
1 N/A 40 N/A
2 0 40 100%
3 1.5 35.51 81.67%
4 4 20 50%
Table 2.2: Treatment Summaries
Treatment Session Mean Price S.S. Price Mean Participation S.S. Participation
1 1 46.23 40 N/A N/A
1 2 41.62 40 N/A N/A
1 3 42.84 40 N/A N/A
1 4 43.02 40 N/A N/A
2 5 41.44 40 72.6% 100%
2 6 43.89 40 61.9% 100%
2 7 47.04 40 78% 100%
2 8 40.38 40 82.14% 100%
3 9 45.13 35.51 48.15% 81.67%
3 10 48.37 35.51 63.62% 81.67%
3 11 50.77 35.51 65.58% 81.67%
3 12 40.42 35.51 45.32% 81.67%
4 13 28.70 20 63.83% 50%
4 14 25.82 20 60.13% 50%
4 15 25.76 20 55.56% 50%
4 16 29.51 20 66.45% 50%
Table 2.3: Mean Price and Participation Rates per Session
2.5 Experimental Findings
Table 2.2 documents the four treatments along with the model predictions for the steady-
state price and participation rates. Table 2.3 provides aggregate prices and participation
rates per treatment and session. While the benchmark model generally does well at the
aggregate level, some of the comparative statics are counter to the theory. I provide some
justification for why this is the case and develop an extension of the model which can explain
the deviations in Treatment 3. I first start explaining the data at the aggregate level and then
at the individual level. For the individual level data, I run a probit regression to explain the
determinants of the participation decision. I then, demonstrate that subjects have different
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subjective returns depending on past experienced returns. I finally show that differences in
subjective returns are due to differences in how subjects update their expectations.
I report summary statistics at the treatment level. Table 2.4 provides summary statis-
tics for prices, participation rates, subjective expected returns, and realized returns per
treatment. Consistent with survey evidence, I first find that there is large heterogeneity
among subjective returns. Next I find that subjective returns for participants are systemat-
ically higher than non-participants across periods. The fact that Treatment 2 has identical
induced costs among subjects suggests that heterogeneous subjective returns are due to fac-
tors other than induced costs. Finally, I find that the heterogeneity in subjective returns are
persistent throughout the experiment, that there is systematic disagreement on fundamental
values over time.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 provide graphs of the aggregate price and participation rates
for each treatment. Each graph has 4 series which are represented by the different sessions
along with a dotted series which represents the model steady-state predictions. Consistent
with Hommes et al (2005) I find heterogeneity across sessions but each treatment follows a
general pattern.
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Treatment 2
25th pct Median 75th pct Mean Std. Dev. N
Subj. Returns 0.28 1.03 1.95 1.13 3.44 1632
Realized Returns 0.03 1.13 2.08 0.99 2.14 1126
Price 38.99 43.64 46.19 43.19 5.75 204
Participation 0.67 0.78 0.89 0.74 0.19 204
Subj. Returns (Part) 1.12 1.49 1.91 1.60 0.92 51
Subj. Returns (Non) -0.32 0.16 0.66 0.13 0.69 51
Average Difference 0.75 1.15 1.89 1.47 1.30 51
Treatment 3
25th pct Median 75th pct Mean Std. Dev. N
Subj. Returns -0.71 0.32 1.34 0.44 3.31 1479
Realized Returns -1.91 0.09 1.92 -0.02 3.54 704
Price 40.43 44.8 52.31 46.17 6.76 204
Participation 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.56 0.18 204
Subj. Returns (Part) 0.97 1.33 1.72 1.42 1.20 51
Subj. Returns (Non) -0.69 -0.40 -0.06 -0.39 0.79 51
Average Difference 1.11 1.77 2.29 1.81 1.37 51
Treatment 4
25th pct Median 75th pct Mean Std. Dev. N
Subj. Returns -1.62 -0.1 1.75 0.21 4.59 1632
Realized Returns -2.59 0.25 2.63 -0.45 4.47 905
Price 21.56 26.21 31.96 27.44 8.42 204
Participation 0.44 0.67 0.78 0.62 0.19 204
Subj. Returns (Part) 0.53 1.14 1.47 1.06 1.12 51
Subj. Returns (Non) -1.52 -0.99 -0.51 -0.89 1.42 51
Average Difference 1.31 1.99 2.78 1.96 1.95 51
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics by Treatment
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate Prices by Treatment.
2.5.1 Findings for Treatment-level Prices
Consistent with Hypothesis 1:
Finding 1: For Treatments 2 and 4, higher cost treatments have lower mean prices and
participation rates. Treatment 3 has higher mean prices and lower mean participation rates
than Treatments 2 and 4. An extension of the model explains this theoretical deviation and
is formalized in Finding 1b.
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate Participation Rates by Treatment.
To potentially allow for learning over time, it is more accurate to use the mean values
of the second half of each session. For robustness, I provide in the appendix the mean and
median values for the entire series along with fitting an autoregressive process to each session
to find the model implied unconditional means of each series. None of these alternatives have
a qualitative effect on my results.
The model predicts Treatment 1 and 2 should have the same mean price and partici-
pation rates. Treatment 3 should have lower prices and participation rates than Treatment
2 and Treatment 4 should have lower prices and participation rates than Treatment 3. I
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summarize these predictions in the following equation:
p¯1 = p¯2 > p¯3 > p¯4 N¯2 > N¯3 > N¯4
where p¯i is the mean price and N¯ i is the mean participation rate for treatment i. In par-
ticular, the model predicts that higher cost treatments imply both lower mean prices and
participation rates.
In order to formally test my model predictions, I use the Mann-Whitney test. The
Mann-Whitney test is a nonparameteric rank sum test commonly used in the experimen-
tal literature to compare mean values across different treatments (Moffatt 2015). Table 2.5
summarizes the results from the Mann-Whitney tests.
Price
Treatment 1 2 3 4
2 = - < >∗∗
3 > > - >∗∗
4 <∗∗ <∗ <∗∗ -
Participation
Treatment 1 2 3 4
2 - - - -
3 <∗ - < -
4 <∗ > - -
Table 2.5: Mann-Whitney Tests for Price and Participation Rates
The asterisks represent the standard significance levels. I also summarize the results
in the next equation:
p¯3 > p¯1 = p¯2 > p¯4 N¯2 > N¯4 > N¯3
2.5.2 Explanation for Deviations in Treatment 3
All the treatments are in line with the theory except for Treatment 3. I provide an expla-
nation for the deviation from the theory and then extend the benchmark model to explain
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Figure 2.6: 2-period Ahead Forecasts for Treatment 1.
the results. In particular, each session in Treatment 3 has one subject with expectations
consistently higher than the average. Since prices depend on average expectations, realized
prices deviate from the model implied steady-state price. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 document
2-period ahead forecasts for Treatments 1 and 3.
Each graph provides the 2-period ahead forecasts for all 8 subjects within a session.
Figure 2.6 depicts that in a standard session, 2-period ahead forecasts are highly correlated
among subjects as in Hommes et al (2005). In contrast, Figure 2.7 shows that there is always
one subject with 2-period ahead forecasts that are uncorrelated with the other subjects and
consistently higher, in many cases hitting the upper bound. This leads to persistently higher
prices, since prices are an average of every subject’s 2-period ahead forecast. Moreover if the
subject who is consistently providing high 2-period ahead forecasts is also participating in
the market with a high induced cost, they can crowd out subjects with lower induced costs,
leading to a lower participation rate.
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Figure 2.7: 2-period Ahead Forecasts for Treatment 3.
There are multiple potential hypotheses that can explain the behavior of these sub-
jects. Instead of delving into the hypotheses of irrationality and high cognitive loads, I ask
the inverse question: given the existence of subjects with high, uncorrelated forecasts, what
is the implied behavior of the model? I define subjects with high 2-period ahead forecasts
that are uncorrelated with other subjects’ forecasts as an “exuberant” subject, loosely bor-
rowing from Shiller (2000).
Finding 1b: The results in Treatment 3 can be explained by an extension of the bench-
mark model. I find evidence that “exuberant” subjects crowd-out lower cost subjects from the
experiment, leading to higher mean prices and lower mean participation rates than predicted
by the benchmark model.
I extend the model to include an agent with exuberant expectations p¯x that are taken
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Treatment Session Mean Price S.S. Price Mean Participation S.S. Participation
3 9 45.13 47.16 48.15% 42.79%
3 10 48.37 51.39 63.62% 28.71%
3 11 50.77 49.56 65.58% 34.8%
3 12 40.42 41.16 45.32% 62.79%
Table 2.6: Calibration for Treatment 3
as exogenous. I derive the extended model in Appendix B. The steady-state price and
participation rates are:
p¯ =
R−1[(1− h)p¯x + µ− S
N¯
]
1−R−1h
N¯ =
C +
√
C2 − 4k¯S(R− 1)
2k¯
where 1 − h is the fraction of agents with exuberant expectations, and C is a function
of the model parameters. I then calibrate the model by taking the mean expectations
of “exuberant” subjects in the experiment and choose the weight (1 − h) to be 1
9
which
corresponds to the the number of subjects in the experiment plus an automated fund. Table
2.6 lists the predictions of the extended model with the calibrated values from the experiment.
2.5.3 Interpretation of Treatment-level Findings
Finding 1c: While higher induced costs ki lowers the average frequency of positive subjec-
tive returns, participation costs alone cannot account for differences in subjective expected
returns at the session level.
As Findings 1a and 1b demonstrate, while the model generally does well in the aggregate,
subjects are not participating in the stock market solely based on their induced costs. That
is, subjects with a higher induced cost do not necessarily have lower subjective returns than
subjects with lower costs. The following graphs show that mean participation rates cannot
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Figure 2.8: Aggregate Induced Cost and Positive Subjective Returns.
be solely explained by differences in induced participation costs. Figure 2.8 shows the per-
centage of periods that a subject has positive subjective returns and their induced costs. I
rank induced costs from 1 to 8 with 1 being the lowest and 8 being the highest to capture
session and treatment level heterogeneity: Figure 2.8 shows that on average, induced costs
do well at explaining subjective returns. While there is large heterogeneity across sessions,
on average, higher induced costs lowers the percentage rate of positive subjective returns.
Figure 2.9 decomposes the data into Treatments 3 and 4 and shows that while on average,
induced costs explain subjective returns, within a session, participation costs need not align
with subjective returns. In particular, subjects with high induced costs can have higher
subjective returns and subjects with low induced costs can have lower subjective returns,
independent of participation costs.
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Figure 2.9: Induced Cost and Positive Subjective Returns by Treatment.
2.5.4 Findings for Individual Participation Decisions
Finding 1c suggests that there are determinants for the participation decision independent
of participation costs. I now analyze the individual participation decision.
Finding 2: The probability of participating in the stock market is increasing in subjec-
tive expected returns, lagged realized returns, lagged forecasting payoffs, and a price trend.
In order to understand the participation decision at the individual level, I run a
random-effects probit panel data regression with robust standard errors. Random-effects
regressions are preferred over fixed-effects under the probit model because coefficient esti-
mates under fixed-effects are biased. In the appendix, I run robustness checks with logit and
fixed-effects linear probability models and find that the results are similiar. I run the regres-
sion using period, session, and treatment level dummies to capture potential dependence at
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the period, session, and treatment levels.
The baseline random-effects probit regression is of the form:
P (nit = 1|xit, zi) = Φ(α + β′xit + γ′zi + ui)
where nit = 1 is participation, Φ(·) is the CDF normal, i is the subject, t is the period, xit
contain variables that vary both between subjects and periods, zi contains variables that
vary among subjects, β and γ are the regression coefficients, α is the constant term, and ui
is the subject specific term where V (ui) = σ
2
u.
I run three specifications. Specification 1 is the simplest regression which just includes
subjective expected returns. For Specification 2, I add regressors using the guidance of
theory, in particular, a price-trend, risk aversion, and lagged payoffs. The participation and
forecasting payoffs are lagged because it is the last payoff that is in the subjects’ information
set. Then, Specification 3 adds a dummy variable for past experienced payoffs. Table 2.7
shows the results of the regression. I add demographic controls and lags in Appendix B.
2.5.5 Benchmark Regression
Specification 2 is the benchmark regression. I find that subjective returns, lagged realized
returns, lagged forecasting payoff, and price trends matter for stock market participation.
The economic interpretation is as follows. Conditioning on induced costs, a 1 franc increase
in subjective returns leads to a 2.8% increase in the likelihood of participating. Next, a 1
franc increase in lagged realized returns increases the likelihood of participating by 1.8%. A
1 franc increase in past forecasting payoffs increases the likelihood of participating by 1.9%.
Finally, subjects place weight on price trends, that is a 1 franc increase in the price trend
increases the likelihood of participating by 1.3%.
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Table 2.7: Dependent Variable: Individual Participation
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Subjective Returnst 0.03*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.009)
Actual Returnst−1 0.018*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
Forecast Payofft−1 0.019*** 0.01*
(0.006) (0.006)
Risk Aversion 0.039 0.035
(0.026) (0.023)
Price Trendt−1 0.013*** 0.01**
(0.005) (0.004)
Past Positive Payofft 0.181***
(0.023)
Past Negative Payofft 0.003
(0.03)
N 4896 4704 4704
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.157 0.172
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
2.5.6 Past Experienced Payoffs
The fact that participation depends on lagged actual returns suggests that participation
may depend on past experiences. To test this hypothesis, I create a dummy variables which
splits the dataset into 3 parts. In particular, subjects can receive 3 categories of payments
depending on their participation decision. If the subject does not participate, then they
receive the risk-free payoff. If the subject participates, then they receive either a high payoff
or a low payoff depending on realized returns. Surprisingly, I find that if a subject receives
a high payoff from participating, they are 18.1% more likely to participate in the stock
market. In contrast, when subjects receive a low payoff, it has no significant effect on the
likelihood of participation. The price-trend controls for the fact that past high payoffs may
signal future high payoffs i.e. if subjects are in a rising price-trend environment. I find that
even controlling for the trending price, subjects are more likely to participate given higher
past returns. The fact that the effect is not symmetric suggests that there is some bias in
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subjects’ updating rule.
2.5.7 Interpretation
In line with past empirical evidence, the regression results provide strong econometric evi-
dence that higher subjective returns lead to higher probability of participating in the stock
market. More importantly in contrast to the benchmark model, the results show that high
past realized returns increases the likelihood of participation. The fact that the coefficient
on past positive payoffs are highly positive implies that there is some inertia to participa-
tion when subjects receive a high payoff. Nevertheless, since subjective returns are also a
function of past realized returns, in order to distinguish the impact of realized returns, that
is, whether past positive returns lead to higher subjective returns or if past negative returns
lead to lower subjective returns, I look directly at subjects’ expectations updating behavior.
2.5.8 Learning from Experience
Finding 3: Subjects who participate in the stock market in the prior period and receive a
low payoff, have lower subjective expected returns. In particular, they place less weight on
the price trend.
Finding 2 demonstrates that subjective expected returns are the main driver of individual
participation, while higher lagged realized returns increases the probability of participation.
Moreover, Table 2.4 demonstrates that the subjective returns of participants are system-
atically higher than non-participants. My experimental design allows a novel look at how
subjects update their expectations. In particular I find that subjects who experience a low
payoff place a lower weight on the forecast trend and thus have a lower subjective return.
To formally test my hypothesis, I run 3 different regressions. I run a regression on
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subjects’ 1-period ahead forecast, 2-period ahead forecast, and forecast trend i.e. pet+1 − pet
on lagged prices and participation along with a dummy for past realized payoffs. The first
result is that subjects update their 1-period ahead forecast towards past prices independent
of past realized payoffs. That is, subjects update towards the signal (Chambers and Healy
2012). Similarly subjects weigh the 2-period ahead forecast toward past prices but using
different weights. A 1 franc increase in lagged prices leads to a 1.3 franc increase in the
2-period ahead forecast while a 1 franc increase in the 2-period lagged price decrease the
2-period ahead forecast by 0.37 francs. Interestingly, subjects’ past experiences only have a
statistically significant impact on the 2-period ahead forecast, that is, past positive payoffs
leads to higher 2-period ahead forecasts and past negative payoffs lead to lower 2-period
ahead forecasts. If subjects’ experience a low payoff last period, then they lower their 2-
period ahead forecast by -0.53 while if they experience a high payoff last period, they increase
their 2-period ahead forecast by 0.43.
Table 2.8: Dependent Variable: 1-Period, 2-Period, Forecast Trend
Variable 1-Period Forecast 2-Period Forecast Forecast Trend
Pricet−1 1.24*** 1.323***
(0.045) (0.063)
Pricet−2 -0.259*** -0.374***
(0.042) (0.0618)
Participationt−1 0.502*** 0.962***
(0.165) (0.248)
Price Trendt−1 0.0264
(0.219)
Past Positive Payofft 0.224 0.428* -0.142
(0.224) (0.217) (0.147)
Past Negative Payofft -0.183 -0.525* -0.772***
(0.183) (0.295) (0.2)
N 4508 4508 4508
R2 0.945 0.883 0.025
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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2.5.9 Interpretation
The underlying story is that differences in subjective returns due to differences in experi-
ence, can lead to implicit costs to stock market participation. Since the standard framework
assumes that participation costs are utility costs, high participation costs are equivalent
to having a lower expected utility which depends on subjective expected returns. My re-
sults demonstrate that differences in experiences can create “pseudo-costs” to stock market
participation that differ from standard participation costs. Moreover, since differences in
subjective returns are directly measurable, I provide a testable story for explaining limited
participation among non-liquidity constrained households. The underlying mechanism is
behavioral in that losses hurt more than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In essence,
confronting an agent that “learns from experience”, they will tell you that they expect lower
returns since they have directly experienced them.
2.5.10 Discouraged Investors
Finding 4: A fraction of subjects exit the market for the majority of the experiment after
consecutive low payoffs.
Additionally, the experiment provides a unique environment to identify novel behavioral
phenomena that are difficult to elicit from survey data. I find evidence of subjects who
exit the market after consecutive low payoffs from participating in the stock market. I call
these subjects “discouraged investors”. To formally identify discouraged investors, I define a
variable called failure rates, where if the subject participated in the stock market in period
t − 1 and received a payoff lower than the risk-free payoff, then it is considered a failure.
In particular, there are 10 subjects out of 96 that fit this criterion. I find that discouraged
investors end the experiment with failure rates close to 100% since they no longer participate
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for the rest of the experiment.
This can potentially be rationalized by an ambiguity aversion or robust control model
where subjects make robust choices against the worst-case scenario model. This finding is in
line with Strahilevitz et al (2011) where investors are reluctant to return to the stock market
once they realized low payoffs. Thus I provide experimental evidence for a novel behavioral
financial phenomena.
2.6 Conclusion
My experimental results demonstrate that a model of heterogeneous participation costs with
rational expectations (RE) alone cannot explain limited participation of the non-liquidity
constrained. Moreover, dispersion within subjective expected returns can be due to “learning
from experience” where subjects over-weigh public signals with respect to realized outcomes
i.e. higher and lower returns.
My experiment provides three answers that are novel to the literature on heterogenous
expectations and asset pricing. First I show that heterogeneity in subjective expected returns
along with non-rational expectations are needed to explain limited participation among the
non-liquidity constrained in an experimental context. Second I provide direct evidence for
the conjecture in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) that “true experiences” are the determi-
nants of “learning from experience”, that is, it is the subjects’ experiences i.e. low versus
high realized returns that determine whether they bias their updates or not, not just the
history. Finally, I provide strong evidence for the claim in Dominitz and Manski (2011), that
heterogeneity in subjective expectations are due to weighing the public signal differently.
While my paper answers some key questions, others remain. For instance, what de-
termines the initial beliefs of subjects? Next, while I showed that heterogeneity can be
generated by the same learning rule which weighs outcomes differently, there is a large lit-
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erature following Hommes et al (2005) that explains dispersion in beliefs through intrinsic
heterogeneity, that is, where agents use different learning rules. Future research should look
at differentiating between these two modeling approaches. For simplicity, my experiment
provides a stationary environment with no private information and common knowledge. A
natural extension is to relax each component in turn to see the impact of richer environments
on both heterogenous subjective returns and outcomes. Moreover, since investors tend to
have different planning horizons, it would be interesting to see how multiple horizons will
affect the results.
Finally, my experiment provides a novel extension to the standard LtF design which
allows for a participation decision. Many expectations-based models can be augmented to
include an extensive margin decision and tested in the laboratory such as the cobweb model
with firm entry.
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Chapter 3
Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and
Restricted-Perceptions Equilibria
3.1 Introduction
While the rational expectations hypothesis is both parsimonious and elegant, it requires de-
manding assumptions on part of the agents. In response, the adaptive learning literature has
moved towards relaxing the hypothesis using econometric learning (Evans and Honkapohja
2001). With econometric learning, agents act as econometricians and must estimate the
model parameters over time. A criticism of this approach is the passive nature of the learn-
ing mechanism and that the rational expectations equilibria (REE) of a model are the only
possible points of convergence. Similarly, deviations from this approach such as restricted
perceptions, where agents underparameterize their models, have faced criticism because they
do not nest the REE and hence do not give the rational expectations solution a chance. Con-
trary to agents in learning models, modern econometricians also test the specification of their
models and should be able to detect misspecification over time.
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More recently, Cho and Kasa (2014) extend the econometric learning model to a setting
where a policy maker suspects that their model is misspecified and also tests the specifica-
tion of their model over time. I extend upon their framework and allow multiple agents
to test the specification of their model in a simple asset pricing framework. In my setting,
groups of agents are endowed with either the fully-specified model or an underparameterized
one i.e. have restricted perceptions. Agents suspect that their model is misspecified and
test the specification with new data. If it passes, the model is updated using least-squares
learning. If it fails, then the agent draws a new model from a set of models. Following the
theme of econometric terminology, I call this procedure hypothesis testing learning.1 The
main question is whether other equilibria naturally arise besides the REE, under hypothesis
testing learning.
I find that in a simple asset pricing model, where agents engage in hypothesis testing
learning, restricted perceptions equilibria (RPE), that is, the equilibrium points of under-
parameterized models naturally arise. My environment calls for a new stability definition
which I call HT-stability or Hypothesis Testing stability. For an equilibrium to be HT-stable,
it needs to be robust to shocks, which I define here to be a model shock. Similar to the idea
behind impulse-response functions, I allow the model to converge to a steady-state and force
one agent type to switch their model i.e. a model shock. HT-stability then requires that
the system return to its original steady-state equilibrium values. Under this definition and
reasonable parameters, the REE is not HT-stable and in particular only RPE corresponding
to combinations of underparameterized models are HT-stable. In particular, no agents hold
the fully parameterized model in HT-stable equilibria.
This finding is similar to those in Sargent (1999) and Cho and Kasa (2014) which relate
the strength of the self-referential feedback to the resilience of certain equilibria compared to
others. In our case, there are two reasons why the REE fails to be HT-stable. First like in
Cho and Kasa (2014), the self-referential feedback of the REE is not as strong as the other
1Cho and Kasa (2014) call this “model validation” but the original idea from Foster and Young (2003)
uses the term hypothesis testing.
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equilibria when the other agents hold underparameterized models. Next, the REE in our
base case has three different parameters which are tested and hence is much easier to reject
in environments where the other agents have misspecified models. In particular, with three
parameters, the agent is easily able to detect shifts in the model parameters and likely to
discard their model.
Finally, given that the model has multiplicity of RPE, I implement constant-gain learn-
ing to characterize the time agents spend within each RPE. I find that the model spends
most of its time within a subset of the RPE and in particular mainly between a subset
of them. Surprisingly, the model spends most of its time in the hybrid equilibria where
all models are used. Using the language of Cho and Kasa (2014), the “dominant model”
i.e., where all agents hold one model most frequently, is not the fully-specified model but
rather the dividend only model. The key implication of my analysis is that agents can have
misspecified models arising naturally from a more realistic learning process over time.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on adaptive learning and more specifically to the
budding literature which examines learning mechanisms where agents are endowed with
multiple models. I also contribute to the literature dealing with alternative equilibrium
concepts to rational expectations such as the restricted-perceptions equilibrium (RPE).
The first paper to propose hypothesis testing as a learning mechanism is Foster and
Young (2003) who have agents test the specification of their models in a stationary game-
theoretic environment. They find that this type of learning converges to a solution that
is approximately a Nash Equilibrium. Next, Branch and Evans (2007) deals with model
uncertainty and its effects on volatility. This paper extends Cho and Kasa (2014) who
examines a policy maker’s decision-making and dynamics under model validation. My paper
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differs from theirs in two key aspects. First, my approach focuses on the stability of equilibria
in a class of models using the techniques introduced in Cho and Kasa (2014). Next, I allow
multiple agents to engage in model validation rather than just one and specifically test
which models are “dominant” in the long-run via simulation. More recently, Norman (2015)
introduces hypothesis testing learning to a macroeconomic setting without adaptive learning
and Cho and Kasa (2017) introduce a sequential Lagrange multiplier (LM) test into a model
with Bayesian averaging.
Next, in the literature on RPE, Branch and Evans (2010, 2011) also deal with RPE in
an asset pricing framework. The closest paper in this strand of the literature is Branch and
Evans (2010) who deal with an RPE switching framework in an asset pricing model. This
paper is different from theres in that I allow fully-specified models to be chosen by agents
through hypothesis testing. As far I know, this paper is the first to extend specification tests
to multiple agents in an asset pricing model and test the model properties through numerical
simulation.
3.3 Model
Time is measured in discrete periods. There is a finite set of models M indexed by m =
1, 2, ...,M . For tractability, agents assume that all models are linear in the exogenous vari-
ables. There is a unit measure of agents divided into m partitions who are each endowed
with an initial model indexed by m ∈ M at time 0. Hence an agent i with model m will
be indexed im. The fraction of agents with initial model m is nm where
∑
m nm = 1. All
agents are infinitely lived and have CARA utility functions of the form: u(c) = −e−ac, where
a > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Agents also maximize their one-period
portfolio.2 There are two assets traded in perfectly competitive markets: a risky Lucas tree
2Alternatively, one can employ an OLG structure which is equivalent to an infinitely lived agent maxi-
mizing their one-period portfolio.
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and a riskless one-period bond. The risky asset yields a dividend stream {Dt}∞t=0 and sells
at price pt. The riskless one-period bond gives an exogenous gross return R > 1 and the
supply is infinitely elastic.
Dividends follow a stationary AR(1) process:
D˜t = (1− ρ)µ+ ρD˜t−1 + Dt
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the AR(1) coefficient, µ > 0, and Dt is white noise with distribution
N(0, σ2D). Similarly, supply follows a stationary AR(1) process:
S˜t = (1− φ)S + φS˜t−1 + St
where φ ∈ [0, 1) is the AR(1) coefficient, S > 0, and St is white noise with distribution
N(0, σ2S). The supply shocks are also possibly correlated with the dividend process such
that the covariance σDS 6= 0. The stochastic supply is a proxy for volatility in asset float
where firms create new issues, provide options and warrants that are periodically exercised
and change the available supply at a given time. The importance of asset float is well
documented in the literature (Baker and Wurgler 2000). I also denote the random variables
with tildes to differentiate them from their mean deviation forms: Dt = D˜t−µ and St = S˜t−S
which will prove useful when deriving the restricted perceptions equilibria (RPE).
Then the pricing equation is:
pt = R
−1[E∗t (pt+1 + D˜t+1)− S˜taσ2p]
where σ2p ≡ V art(pt+1+Dt+1) and E∗t is the (potentially) non-rational conditional expectation
at time t. With rational expectations, E∗t = Et. If agents instead deviate from rational
expectations or use misspecified models, then E∗t =
1
M
∑
mE
m
t , which is the weighted average
of all expectations in the economy conditional on their model, where Emt is the conditional
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expectation at time t with respect to model m.
3.3.1 Base Case
A key assumption here is that some agents have underparameterized models, which is called
restricted perceptions. I motivate restricted perceptions by stating that agents face a degree
of freedoms problem. If there are multiple factors that may influence the dividend or supply
process, it will be difficult for the agent to estimate that process, which may cause agents
to omit some variables. This specification is similar to Branch and Evans (2010) with the
difference that I allow one of the models to be correctly specified.
I implement a simple case of the model with a minimal number of elements in the
model class. A natural benchmark case includes only two underparameterized models where
agents omit one of the two exogenous variables S and D. Hence there are 3 models in the
model set M , in particular, a model where dividends D are omitted and a model where
supply S are omitted, along with the correctly specified model. The following models are:
pt = A1 +B1Dt + C1St + ν1t
pt = A2 +B2Dt + ν2t
pt = A3 + C3St + ν3t
where:
E1t pt+1 = A1 +B1ρDt + C1φSt
E2t pt+1 = A2 +B2ρDt
E3t pt+1 = A3 + C3φSt
Since there are three potential models, each agent can hold one of the three models. Let n1
denote the fraction of agents with model 1, n2 denote the fraction of agents with model 2,
and 1− n1 − n2 denote the fraction of agents with model 3. To simplify the analysis, I have
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this fraction be 1
3
for all models. In discussions, model 1 will be called the fully-specified
model, model 2 will be the dividend model, and model 3 will be the supply model. In this
setup there are potentially two groups of agents in the economy that underparameterize
their forecasting model by either omitting dividends or supply and one group that has the
fully-specified model
In an econometric learning model where switching is determined by forecasting perfor-
mance, the REE is the asymptotic solution. I do not have agents determine which models to
use based on forecasting performance here for two reasons. First when there are structural
changes in the economy like in our setting, choosing models based on past forecasting per-
formance is not necessarily robust. Second in an environment where agents may not know
the entire set of models, agents will be unable to rank forecasting performance, that is, I
assume that agents do not know the entire set of models and hence cannot judge if their
model is better than another one. This interpretation is borrowed from Foster and Young
(2003) who view model selection as formalizing the notion of agents developing “hunches”
of how the economy works over time. Hence, in our setting with hypothesis testing learning,
whether the REE will be the long-run solution is not entirely obvious.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
The pricing equation in the base case then becomes:
pt = R
−1
[
1
3
(E1t pt+1 + E
2
t pt+1 + E
3
t pt+1) + EtDt+1 + µ− (St + S)aσ2p
]
where Emt is the subjective expectation of the agent for model m and at this point I replace
the exogenous processes D˜, S˜ with their mean deviation forms D,S. Plugging in for the
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expectations I get:
pt = ξ0 + ξ1Dt + ξ2St
ξ0 = R
−1[
1
3
(A1 + A2 + A3) + µ− Saσ2p]
ξ1 = R
−1[
1
3
ρ(B1 +B2) + ρ]
ξ2 = R
−1[
1
3
φ(C1 + C3)− aσ2p]
To reiterate, agents with underparameterized models are said to have restricted perceptions.
Two key objects in the learning literature are the perceived law of motion (PLM) and the
actual law of motion (ALM). A PLM is the model that the agents believe are the true data-
generating process while an ALM is the actual model that determines the economy. One
facet of restricted perceptions is that the perceived laws of motion (PLM) of the restricted
perceptions models do not nest an REE and thus it is impossible for them to converge to it.
Nevertheless, models with restricted perceptions can converge to an RPE which is optimal
within a limited class of PLMs.
Although the restricted perceptions models are underparameterized, I will require them
to forecast in a statistically optimal manner and that the model parameters be optimal linear
projections. Intuitively, when forecasts satisfy orthogonality conditions, the agent will be
forecasting optimally within their restricted perceptions and will be acting optimally within
their model, that is, in an RPE, agents will not be able to detect that their models are
misspecified. The orthogonality conditions for the 3 models are thus,
E(1, Dt, St)
′(ξ0 + ξ1Dt + ξ2St − A1 −B1Dt − C1St) = 0
E(1, Dt)
′(ξ0 + ξ1Dt + ξ2St − A2 −B2Dt) = 0
E(1, St)
′(ξ0 + ξ1Dt + ξ2St − A3 − C3St) = 0
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where:
Aj = ξ0, j = 1, 2, 3
B1 = ξ1
B2 = ξ1 + ξ2r
C1 = ξ2
C3 = ξ2 + ξ1r˜
where r = EDtSt
ED2t
and r˜ = EDtSt
ES2t
. Then an RPE is a set of coefficients {ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, A1, A2, A3, B1,
B2, C1, C3} that solves these systems of equations. The coefficients become rather involved
so we leave them for Appendix C.
3.3.3 Adaptive Learning
Agents do not know the model parameters and must estimate them over time. Here, I de-
viate from rational expectations and implement an adaptive learning rule for two reasons.3
Rational expectations requires a full understanding of the model as well as beliefs of other
agents. In this sense it is a Nash equilibrium, hence coordination between agents requires
strong cognitive and informational assumptions. Instead, many applied econometricians es-
timate econometric forecasting models and adjust the coefficients in light of new data. Here
I adhere to the Cognitive Consistency Principle (Sargent 1993) which requires agents and
econometricians to be on equal footing.
Next in an environment such as this where agents possibly entertain multiple models,
it may take time for a new model to converge to its RPE. I allow agents to update their
parameters over time to allow each model to adapt to the environment. With adaptive
learning, parameters are updated with respect to observable data over time. Hence, a mis-
specified model can potentially still converge to some equilibrium value because the model
parameters can adjust such that it fulfills the orthogonality conditions as above.
3The current formulation can be seen as a midpoint between RE and restricted-perceptions.
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Agents in the model update their expectations conditional on data. Let zi
′
t be the data
vector depending on the agent’s model which can include some combination of 1, Dt, and
St. Then let Φ
i
t be the vector of coefficients which include some combination of A
i
t, B
i
t, and
Cit depending on the model. Agents update their pricing coefficients Φ
i
t as follows:
Φit = Φ
i
t−1 + γ1(R
i
t−1)
−1zit[pt − Φi
′
t−1z
i
t]
Rit = R
i
t−1 + γ1[z
i
tz
i′
t −Rit−1]
where γ1 is the gain parameter and R
i
t is the moment matrix for agent i with some model.
3.4 Hypothesis Testing
In addition to updating their models over time, agents also test the specification of their
model. Modern econometricians use statistical tools to test for model misspecification and
update their model specification accordingly. Following the analogy of Cho and Kasa (2014),
one inconsistency of the current learning approach is that we assume agents have taken the
first semester of econometric theory but not the second. That is, the agents understand
estimation but not inference.
We would expect such a procedure to approach the true model, but endogenous data
and misspecification on part of the other agents creates issues. As stated above, I call this
procedure hypothesis testing learning as in Foster and Young (2003). There are potentially
many ways to test the specification of a model. Following Cho and Kasa (2014), I endow
agents with a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) or score test,
uses the score and the Fisher information to test the sensitivity of the likelihood function.
The LM test is a natural choice as a hypothesis testing mechanism because it does not
require that one explicitly specify an alternative hypothesis. Hence it is usually known as a
misspecification test. Moreover, the LM test has a recursive formulation which allows it to
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be naturally added to the tools of stochastic recursive algorithms of the adaptive learning
literature.
The LM test is defined as follows:
Λit = (R
i
t−1)
−1zit[pt − Φi
′
t−1z
i
t]
where the null hypothesis is H0 : Λ
i′
t (Ω
i
t)
−1Λit ≤ τi and where Ωit is the variance of the score
Λit and defined as:
Ωit = Ω
i
t−1 + γ2(Λ
i
tΛ
i′
t − Ωit−1)
Agents update the LM test-statistic as follows:
θit = θ
i
t−1 + γ2(Λ
i
t(Ω
i
t)
−1Λit − θit−1)
Here τi is a threshold value that determines the test-statistic where agents would reject their
model. If the score statistic θit is less than τi then the agent keeps their model, else they
reject it and draw another model. I follow Foster and Young (2003) where agents draw a
new model at random from the set of models. Following their definition, I call this procedure
experimentation, where agents are unaware of the different elements in the model class and
that drawing a model at random is equivalent to having a “hunch”. In the case of 3 models,
the probability of drawing a model m is 1
3
after rejecting their existing model. For now I
allow the agent to redraw their model mainly for computational tractability. After a new
model is drawn, there is also a grace period ξ between drawing a new model and testing it
to give each model’s parameters a chance to adjust to the environment and thus not have it
potentially be immediately rejected upon being drawn.
Once I implement hypothesis testing, the potential space of equilibria increases. With
this environment there are ten equilibria that correspond to the combination of the three
different model types. One of them is the REE while the other nine are RPE. Unfortunately
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with multiple switching, learning, and hypothesis testing I am unable to derive analytical
results due to the complex nonlinearities that arise from the learning algorithms. Instead,
I use numerical analysis and simulations to characterize the local stability and long-run
properties of the different equilibria.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
It is illustrative to describe the numerical algorithm used to simulate and analyze the model. I
first write down the dynamical system by gathering the equations from the previous sections.
Then I describe the algorithm and timing to provide intuition.
Let st = [n1, n2, n3] where ni for i = 1, 2, 3 denotes the fraction of the agents in the
economy that can each be endowed with some model m = 1, 2, 3. While this leads to discrete
model switching, given that all agents of type ni switch once their model is rejected, it leads
to computationally tractable simulations.4 Then, st denotes the set of models agents have
at time t.
I first write down the set of model updating equations:
Φit = Φ
i
t−1 + γ1Λ
i
t
Λit = (R
i
t−1)
−1zit[pt − Φi
′
t−1z
i
t]
Rit = R
i
t−1 + γ1[z
i
tz
i′
t −Rit−1]
where Φit is the vector of belief parameters, Λ
i
t is the score for the model, and R
i
t is the
moment matrix all for agent i. Through the feedback, these determine the pricing equation
or ALM:
pt = R
−1[h(st−1,Φit−1) + EtDt+1 + µ− (St + S)aσ2p]
4Currently this research project is still in an early stage where even running the algorithm is computa-
tionally involved. Future work will deal with less discrete updating by using distributions of test thresholds.
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where h(st−1,Φit−1) is the aggregate expectations of the economy subject to beliefs Φ
i
t−1 and
model set st−1. Notice here, that the pricing equation is also dependent on st−1 which is an
index for the number of model types in the economy. The important aspect of hypothesis
testing is that st−1 is also a function of the realizations pt−1 and test parameters. Next,
models are tested by forming the recursive LM test-statistics:
θit = θ
i
t−1 + γ2(Λ
i
t(Ω
i
t)
−1Λit − θit−1)
Ωit = Ω
i
t−1 + γ2(Λ
i
tΛ
i′
t − Ωit−1)
where the null hypothesis is H0 : Λ
i′
t (Ω
i
t)
−1Λit ≤ τi. And finally, the set of models is deter-
mined by:
st = f(st−1, pt, τi, ξ)
where st depends on the ALM pt, the test thresholds τi, and the grace period ξ. Because
the law of motion for st is a complex nonlinear equation that depends on the rest of the
dynamic system, I rely on numerical simulations. Intuitively, agents update their beliefs via
least- squares and their beliefs lead to some realization of the ALM. Using the new data,
agents test their models and decide to either accept or reject their model. Finally, the set of
models are either changed or left alone. The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1. Agents are endowed with a model m ∈M and initial beliefs Φ0.
Step 2. Endogenous value pt is realized through market clearing.
Step 3. Each agent updates their beliefs Φt,m, θt,m with respect to new data.
Step 4. After the grace period ξ, each agent also tests the specification of their model.
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Step 5. If the null hypothesis H0 is rejected, then agents draw another model at ran-
dom.
Step 6. Repeat.
To further clarify the hypothesis testing mechanism, Figure 3.1 demonstrates a hy-
pothetical model switching tree diagram. Figure 3.1 takes the switching probabilities of the
other agents as given and demonstrates the probability of switching for the representative
agent with model 1 (m1) after model rejection. Here the triple (n1, n2, n3) denotes the frac-
tion of the population with the respective models, where the first element is model 1, the
second element is model 2, and the third element is model 3. For example, the triple (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
means that each representative agent holds one of the three models.
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Figure 3.1: Model Switching Tree Diagram. Representative agent 1 given model 1 is rejected.
3.5.1 Parameterization
Since I am not doing a calibration exercise, the choice of parameterization is mainly for
expositional purposes. I parameterize the model as follows:
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Parameters Meaning Calibration
a Risk Aversion 0.15
R Risk-free Rate 1.02
µ Mean Dividend 1
S Mean Supply 1
σ2D Std Dev. of Dividend 0.45
σ2S Std Dev. of Supply 0.45
ρ AR(1) Dividend Coefficient 0.45
η AR(1) Supply Coefficient 0.45
σDS Cov. of Dividend and Supply 0.45
ξ Grace Periods 5
γ1 Parameter Gain t
−1
γ2 LM Test Gain 0.00025
N # of Iterations 100,000
Table 3.1: Parameter Values
I discuss the parameter choices for the hypothesis testing algorithm. I choose a grace
period ξ of 5 to allow models to adapt to their environment when chosen. That is, agents
wait 5 periods before testing their models. Next, the parameter gain γ1 is set to a decreasing-
gain initially to check for local stability under learning via a new definition I explain later.
In subsequent sections, I also have agents implement a constant-gain as well. The LM test
gain γ2 is not chosen to be a decreasing-gain for the same reason as Cho and Kasa (2014)
where I require the gain on the score statistic to be larger than the parameter updates or
else the score statistics will depend on the history of the estimates rather than the current
magnitudes. Intuitively, I want the updates to be slow enough such that the model is not
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rejected by a large shock but fast enough such that the test can detect parametric changes.5
3.5.2 HT-Stability
In order to test for local stability, I need to specify a definition that fits hypothesis testing
learning. One issue with local stability is that, with a sufficiently high test-statistic, all the
RPE are trivially locally stable because there is no switching in these scenarios.6 Instead,
I want a robust form of local stability when allowing for model switching. In particular, I
want to understand which equilibria are robust in some sense to model changes i.e. a model
shock. I call this HT-stability with respect to τ (or Hypothesis Testing stable), which can
be thought of as a hypothesis test with a test-statistic threshold of τ .
I call an equilibrium HT-stable(τ) (HT-stable with respect to τ) if it satisfies the fol-
lowing criteria. First the equilibrium must be either an RPE or REE of the system. Second
if the system is in an equilibrium, the equilibrium must be locally stable to all one-model
shocks to the system. Similar to the idea behind impulse-responses, I define a one-model
shock as follows. Suppose an environment converges to its equilibrium values after N peri-
ods. At period N + 1, I force one of the representative agents to switch their model. An
equilibrium is then HT-stable(τ) if after the model shock, it returns to the RPE over time.
With the definition above, many if not all the equilibria will possibly by HT-stable
for some value τ , that is, if τ is sufficiently large, no amount of misspecification will reject
the model. Hence when checking for HT-stability, I use a more stringent method. I say an
equilibrium is HT-stable(τ¯) if it converges to its equilibrium values after a one-model shock
with respect to its equilibrium LM test-statistic value τ¯ . I define the equilibrium threshold
value τ¯ as the LM test-statistic that the model converges to without model switching. That
is, if all agents have some model m, the equilibrium τ¯ is the average τ that results in this en-
vironment. One caveat of this definition is that some models will be more misspecified than
5Cho and Kasa (2014) explain in detail the technical reasons for this choice.
6We can think of the standard econometric learning case as one where the test threshold τ goes to ∞.
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others and thus will be harder to reject in equilibrium.7 Nevertheless, the above definition
provides a useful benchmark to understand the interactions between adaptive learning and
hypothesis testing with multiple agents.8
I find that not all of the RPE are HT-stable(τ¯). In particular, the REE is not HT-
stable(τ¯). The fully-specified model has three parameters that need to be matched which
makes the LM test very sensitive to changes in the environment. Hence a model shock causes
other agents to eventually discard their model as well and over time it diverges away from
the REE values.
I provide some intuition on why the REE is not HT-stable(τ¯). The REE is not HT-
stable(τ¯) because when the REE is subject to a model shock, it raises the LM test-statistic
causing the fully-specified model to be rejected. Over time, all models shift because the
equilibrium threshold for the REE is close to zero. With a finite grace period ξ the LM
test-statistic is unable to adjust below the threshold value and hence the model does not
converge but switches between different equilibria.
In Table 3.2, I write down a list of all the potential equilibria (REE, RPE) and list if
they are HT-stable(τ¯) or not. I number them and call them “regimes” which will prove useful
in the following section with constant-gain learning, where parameter values may be away
from the equilibrium estimates. To reiterate, model 1 is the fully-specified model, model 2
is the dividend model, and model 3 is the supply model.
7While the one-model shock is not a local shock, it does reveal some properties of the strength of a
particular RPE.
8Two interesting extensions would be to see what happens if we use a common τ across all models and
to have a model where all models are equally misspecified and thus have equivalent τ¯ .
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Regime Equilibrium HT-Stable(τ¯)
1 (1, 0, 0) No
2 (0, 1, 0) Yes
3 (0, 0, 1) Yes
4 (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) No
5 (2
3
, 1
3
, 0) No
6 (1
3
, 2
3
, 0) No
7 (0, 1
3
, 2
3
) Yes
8 (0, 2
3
, 1
3
) Yes
9 (1
3
, 0, 2
3
) No
10 (2
3
, 0, 1
3
) No
Table 3.2: HT-Stability of RPE and Regime Numbers
I find that the only HT-stable(τ¯) equilibria are combinations of models 2 and 3. In particular,
since both of these models are already misspecified, their equilibrium threshold τ¯ are higher
than the REE model. Next the higher τ¯ values allow certain models to be more robust
towards changing beliefs. Intuitively, agents in these models are used to higher test-statistics
and are less able to detect that the environment has changed. In contrast, agents with the
fully-specified model more easily detect changes in the environment which is signaled through
a higher LM test-statistic.9
I now show a case of HT-stability for the RPE corresponding to the all dividends model
(0-1-0). For HT-stability I simulate the model for N periods and then shock the model at
time N + 1 where I force one of the models to switch. The equilibrium LM test-statistic τ¯
for the all dividend RPE is τ¯ = 2 and I set that as the threshold. I then run the model for
another N periods. Figure 3.2 shows the process of HT-stability. We see that after the shock,
9Another potential extension would be to have a distribution of agents with different test-statistic thresh-
olds.
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the model stays in a different environment for some time and then as the LM test-statistic
starts to increase in the other models, it shifts back to the (0-1-0) RPE.
Figure 3.2: HT-stability Test for All Dividends RPE
One concern about HT-stability may be robustness. Both the choice of τ and grace
period length ξ are important for convergence after the shock. In order to demonstrate some
robustness, I also do the exercise for ξ = 5 and 10, γ2 = 0.0001 and 0.00025, and τ¯ ± 0.1. I
find that the results do not change for the different robustness checks.
3.5.3 Constant-Gain Learning
I now implement constant-gain learning and find that a subset of the RPE are utilized more
than others. This is because some models are less sensitive to the LM test, depending on
both the number of parameters that need to be estimated and the feedback properties of
the restricted-perceptions equilibria (RPE). The constant-gain learning simulation is the
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computational counterpart to the analytical results of Cho and Kasa (2014), where they
demonstrate that some models are “dominant” in the long-run i.e. models that are used
“almost always”.10
I run two different simulations and show the time spent within each model. For the
first simulation I use γ1 = 0.001 and γ2 = 0.03 at 500,000 iterations, where γ1 is the gain
parameter for the estimates and γ2 is the gain parameter for the score statistic. For the
second simulation I use γ1 = 0.005 and γ2 = 0.07.
11 I set the test threshold τi to 2 and
initialize the model at the RPE where all models are used (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), where again the triple
(n1, n2, n3) denotes the fraction of the population that holds each model. To insure that
initial conditions do not heavily influence the results, I also burn in the first half of the
simulations.
Again, for notational simplicity, I define the ten different possible model combinations
as “regimes” rather than equilibria, given that at any time t, the parameter estimates may
be away from the RPE (or REE) values. In Table 3.2, I define the regime numbers for the
different states. For example, Regime 1 is (1, 0, 0) which is the regime where all agents hold
the correct model. Regime 4 is (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), where a fraction 1
3
each hold one of the three models.
10The technical definition uses large deviation theory and analyzes the invariant distribution of the model
set as the gain parameter goes to 0. Intuitively, their definition is similar to Foster and Young (2003), where
one model is used almost all the time in the limit.
11As in Cho and Kasa (2014), it is convenient to raise γα2 where here α =
1
2 . With some abuse of notation,
γ
1
2
2 = 0.001
1
2 ≈ 0.03.
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Figure 3.3: Constant Gain Learning Fractions γ1 = 0.001, γ2 = 0.03
Figure 3.4: Constant Gain Learning Fractions γ1 = 0.005, γ2 = 0.07
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the fraction of the time spent within each regime. There
are three findings from Figures 3.3 and 3.4. First, Regime 1, where all agents use the fully-
specified model, is not used very often even though the test threshold is relatively high at
τi = 2. Next, the regime that the model spends the most time in is the hybrid regime
(1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), which is surprising given that it is not HT-stable. A key reason for this may be the
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discrete nature of the model switching mechanism here.12 Finally, the “dominant model”
in the simulations, where all agents hold one model most frequently, is the dividend model
(0, 1, 0). While the fact that the dominant model is not the correct model is surprising,
it is consistent with Cho and Kasa (2014) who conjecture that the correct model will not
necessarily be dominant depending on the feedback parameters of the model.
It is important to provide intuition why the correct model is not used the most by all
agents. Similar to the explanation in Cho and Kasa (2014), there are two counterbalancing
mechanisms involved. First, while a higher test threshold makes the specified model less
likely to be rejected, all else equal, it also makes the misspecified models less likely to be
rejected as well. Because the misspecified models are also held by other agents, the fully-
specified model is then more likely to be rejected outside an REE. Thus certain equilibria
may be more fragile than others depending on the feedback mechanisms within the model.
Figure 3.5: Constant Gain Learning Fractions γ1 = 0.001, γ2 = 0.03
12Future work can see how robust this finding is to different model switching mechanisms.
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Figure 3.6: Constant Gain Learning Fractions γ1 = 0.001, γ2 = 0.03
Another way to visualize the simulations are Figures 3.5 and 3.6 which show how
much time agents spend in each model. Figure 3.5 shows the fraction of time spent within
each model while Figure 3.6 shows the data for two models holding one of the models fixed.
For instance, in the top panel of Figure 3.6, the first column is how much time is spent
in the fully-specified model (1, 0, 0) and the second column is the amount of time spent in
the regime (2
3
, 1
3
, 0). I remove the hybrid equilibria (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) to make a better comparison
between the other regimes. Another interesting finding of the simulations is that the basin
of attraction seems to be around regimes with the dividend model and in particular, regimes
with model 3, the supply model, tend to not be seen. Finally, adding a higher gain to the
simulation does not change the shape of the distribution but adds more weight onto certain
hybrid regimes.
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3.5.4 Robustness Check
Here I do two robustness checks. First I simulate the model with larger test thresholds
τi = 10 and a longer grace period ξ = 20 and find that it is robust to this specification.
Figure 3.7 shows the first robustness check. Again, the finding is consistent with Cho and
Kasa (2014) who demonstrate that the dominant model depends on the H-functional and
the LD rate function13 which is ambiguous even in the simple linear case.
For the second robustness check, I change the initial conditions of the new model when
agents switch their models following rejection. Currently, when an agent switches their
model, the initial conditions of the new parameter estimates are switched to the steady-
state values consistent with the RPE (or REE) of the new model.
Figure 3.7: Constant Gain Learning Fractions γ1 = 0.001, γ2 = 0.03, τi = 10, ξ = 20
13These functions characterize the probability of escape paths and feedback strengths of the RPE.
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Figure 3.8: Constant Gain Learning Fractions with Different Switching Rule
In the second robustness check, I instead have agents switch to their previous parameter
estimates and any estimates on the previously omitted variables (e.g. dividend D or supply
S) are given the RPE (or REE) steady-state values as the initial conditions. Figure 3.8
shows that while this spreads the distribution more towards hybrid regimes, the same pattern
persists. In particular, notice that instead of 45% of the time spent in Regime 4 (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
30% of the time is spent there, while more weight is placed on the other regimes.
I suspect that with a large enough test threshold and grace period, the REE may be
the dominant model. Nevertheless, with constant-gain learning, the parameter estimates are
constantly drifting, such that with a large enough shock, the model enters an escape path
which triggers a rejection, making it difficult to return to the REE. Thus, as in Cho and
Kasa (2014) the probability of entering the escape path determined by the LD rate function
and the feedback properties of the RPE via the H-functional characterize which models are
dominant in the long-run.
The constant-gain learning simulations and HT-stability suggest that the connection
between them are not as strong as we would suspect, that is, HT-stability equilibria here do
not necessarily seem to be regimes that are regularly visited under constant-gain learning.
93
One possible explanation is that the model shock here is a large shock and that HT-stability
tells us more about the strength of the RPE rather than local stability. Future work should
try to establish a stronger connection by possibly using a less discrete switching mechanism
and refining the definition of stability.
3.6 Conclusion
I have demonstrated that in an asset pricing environment with hypothesis testing learning,
the REE is not necessarily the stable equilibrium. Moreover, with constant-gain learning,
agents spend most of their time using both the fully-specified and underparameterized models
and the model switches between a subset of the RPEs.
The current project can be seen as a numerical examination of a potentially more
general claim, which is that RPE can arise via a more natural learning mechanism than
standard econometric learning. In particular, I fix the test thresholds, model class, and grace
period. Since I have shown that under certain conditions, RPE can arise as the dominant
model i.e. models that are used the most in the limit, the next step is to prove this in a
more general case.
Cho and Kasa (2014) show that in a linear Gaussian version of their model, there is
ambiguity in dominant models even if the model class includes the true model because of the
interaction between the model feedback parameters and the functions that determine the
escape paths (the H-functional and the Large Deviation (LD) rate function). An important
step in the literature would be to see which parameter values in a linear Gaussian case lead
to misspecified models being dominant models under hypothesis testing.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Derivation of Equation (1.7): The expected value of the utility of c1t is:
Etu(c1t) = Et[−e−ρc1t ] = −e−ρEtc1t+
ρ2
2
Vtc1t (A.1)
since c1t is normally distributed. Then:
Etc1t = R + xt[Et(pt+1 +Dt+1)−Rpt]
Vtc1t = x
2
tσ
2
p
We know:
xt =
Et(pt+1 +Dt+1)−Rpt
ρσ2p
Plugging this into Equation (A.1) I get:
Etu(c1t) = −e−ρR−ρ[Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−Rpt]+
ρ2
2
x2tσ
2
p
= −eρR−ρ
Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−Rpt
ρσ2p
+ ρ
2
2
[
Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−Rpt
ρσ2p
]2
σ2p
= −e−ρR−
[Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−Rpt]2
2σ2p
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And thus:
Γ(pt) = e
−ρR − e−ρR−
[Et(pt+1+Dt+1)−Rpt]2
2σ2p
Proof of Proposition 1: I focus on interior equilibria where
Sρσ2p
µ
< Ae−ρR[1 − e−
µ2
2σ2p ].
Fix a set of parameters. Both 1
x¯
and e¯ are compositions of continuous functions and hence
continuous. With market clearing, 1
x¯
= e¯
S
implies 1
x¯
is below the e¯ equation at p¯ = 0. If the
equation 1
x¯
is above the participation curve, then the equilibrium condition is the intercept
of the participation curve. Next I take the limit of 1
x¯
as p¯ goes to µ
R−1 . The equation
1
x¯
approaches ∞. Since e¯ is bounded and monotonic in p¯, we know that there exists a point
on 1
x¯
where 1
x¯
> 1. Hence by, the intermediate value theorem, there exists a point where
they cross. Because both curves are monotonic within the given parameter space and since
x¯ > 0, it is unique. Hence, there exists a unique steady-state p¯.
Proof of Proposition 2: I implicitly differentiate e¯ with respect to the parameters. µ is not
in the equation hence ∂e¯
∂µ
= 0. ∂e¯
∂R
, ∂e¯
∂σ2p
, ∂e¯
∂A
all follow from standard differentiation. A appears
as a multiplier and hence ∂e¯
∂A
> 0. ∂e¯
∂R
= Ae¯
3ρ(1−e
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 )
e¯3e
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +Aρ2σ2p
. Since e
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 > 1 =⇒ ∂e¯
∂R
< 0.
∂e¯
∂σ2p
= e¯Aρ
2
2e¯3e
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +2Aρ2σ2p
=⇒ ∂e¯
∂σ2p
> 0. ∂e¯
∂ρ
=
Ae¯3R−Ae¯3e
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +Ae¯ρσ2p
e¯3e
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +Aρ2σ2p
. Hence ∂e¯
∂ρ
is positive when
R > e
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +
ρσ2p
e¯2
, negative if the sign is opposite and 0 at equality.
Proof of Proposition 3: I use the chain rule. Let Ω be the set of model parameters.
Then p¯ = f(e¯(Ω),Ω) which implies ∂p¯
∂Ω
= ∂f
∂Ω
+ ∂f
∂e¯
∂e¯
∂Ω
. A only appears in e¯. ∂e¯
∂A
> 0 hence,
∂p¯
∂A
> 0. µ does not appear in e¯ and ∂x¯
∂µ
> 0 hence ∂p¯
∂µ
> 0. ∂x¯
∂R
< 0 and ∂e¯
∂R
< 0, hence ∂p¯
dR
< 0.
∂x¯
∂σ2p
< 0 and ∂x¯
∂ρ
< 0. ∂p¯
∂ρ
= −
[
σ2p
e¯
− ρσ
2
p
∂e¯
∂ρ
e¯2
]
S
R−1 and
∂p¯
∂σ2p
= −
[
ρ
e¯
−
ρσ2p
∂e¯
∂σ2p
e¯2
]
S
R−1 . Then
∂p¯
∂σ2p
< 0
if ∂e¯
∂σ2p
< e¯
σ2p
⇐⇒ σ2pAρ2
2e¯ee
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +2Aρ2σ2p
< 1 ⇐⇒ σ2pAρ2(−2e¯3e
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 −1)
2e¯3e
Rρ+
ρ2σ2p
2e¯2 +2Aρ2σ2p
< 0 which is always true.
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∂p¯
∂ρ
is positive if ∂e¯
∂ρ
> e¯
ρ
and negative if less than, 0 at equality.
Proof of Proposition 4: Proposition 5.2 in Evans and Honkapohja (1995) is the result I
use to prove my case. The requirements are that the gain parameter γ > 0 is a decreas-
ing sequence, the shocks St are iid with E(
S
t ) = 0, V ar(
S
t ) > 0 and either (1) |St | < α
with probability 1 for all t or (2) E|St |p exists and is bounded in t for each p > 1, and the
derivatives of G and H are bounded. I claim to satisfy condition (1). First St is iid by
definition. Next for some α sufficiently small, as long as σ2S is sufficiently small, or I bound
the distribution of St , then Proposition 5.2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof depends on Evans and Honkapohja (2001) E-stability
condition which requires the eigenvalues of the T-map to have negative real parts. First, if
the sequence of shocks {St }∞t=0 are such that |St | < α with probability 1 for all t and α > 0
is sufficiently small then Proposition 4 holds and there exists a unique noisy steady-state
REE. Our PLM is pt = a + νt which implies that p
e
t = a + νt = p
e
t+1. Then the ALM is
pt = R
−1
[
a+ µ− S
et
ρσ2p
]
. Then the T-map is: da
dτ
= R−1
[
a+ µ− St
et
ρσ2p
]
− a which can be
rewritten as da
dτ
= a(R−1 − 1) + R−1(µ − St
et
ρσ2p). Furthermore, since e is a function of a, I
need to sign the derivative of e with respect to a which is de
da
< 0. Given that de
da
< 0, the
T-map satisfies the local stability conditions by definition and hence proves my proposition.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.0.1 Additional Summary Statistics
Here I list additional summary statistics for prices and participation rates per session. In
particular, I list the median, 2nd half mean, and a time-series fit. The time-series fit which is
called AR(1) in Table B.1, is a time-series regression on each session’s price and participation
series to estimate the constant and AR(1) coefficients. Then I take the implied unconditional
average of the series using the estimated values. The additional summary statistics show
that in general the different measures of average behavior are all very similar.
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Treatment Session Med. Price Med. Part. AR(1) Price AR(1) Part.
1 1 45.52 N/A 45.85 N/A
1 2 42.45 N/A 39.88 N/A
1 3 41.84 N/A 42.28 N/A
1 4 43.66 N/A 42.05 N/A
2 5 41.32 77.78% 40.82 74.2%
2 6 43.38 66.67% 42.5 58.22%
2 7 45.64 77.78% 46.32 78.59%
2 8 39.84 88.89% 40.15 81.7%
3 9 43.79 44.44% 45.29 49%
3 10 48.77 66.67% 50.74 63.83%
3 11 52.07 66.67% 51.73 65.9%
3 12 40.25 44.44% 40.24 46.4%
4 13 28.46 66.67% 27.52 64.79%
4 14 25.46 66.67% 22.32 59.14%
4 15 23.76 55.56% 23.42 54.92%
4 16 29.26 77.78% 27.22 66.67%
Table B.1: Additional Summary Statistics
B.0.2 Robustness Checks
I perform robustness checks. I first show the regressions for Finding 2 using the linear
probability model with fixed effects. Since fixed effects are not biased with linear probability
models, they are preferred to random effects. Table B.2 shows the results for the linear
probability model.
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Table B.2: Dependent Variable: Individual Participation (LPM)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Subjective Returnst 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Actual Returnst−1 0.017*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Forecast Payofft−1 0.017*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
Price Trendt−1 0.011*** 0.01**
(0.004) (0.004)
Past Positive Payofft 0.139***
(0.023)
Past Negative Payofft -0.002
(0.029)
N 4896 4704 4704
R2 0.059 0.085 0.149
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table B.3: Dependent Variable: Individual Participation (Logit)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Subjective Returnst 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Actual Returnst−1 0.017*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
Forecast Payofft−1 0.019*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.006)
Risk Aversion 0.04 0.036
(0.027) (0.026)
Price Trendt−1 0.011** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004)
Past Positive Payofft 0.154***
(0.027)
Past Negative Payofft 0.001
(0.028)
N 4896 4704 4704
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.181 0.193
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
We can see that the coefficients are very similar to the probit model. Next I run the
logit model with random effects. Table B.3 shows the results for the logit model. Again,
the results are very similar. Finally, in Table B.4 I show the demographic regressions along
with an added lag. The demographic regressions show that they are insignificant to the
regression. The lagged regression shows that the only lags that matter are the 2-period
lagged price trend and the direction of the 2-period lagged payoff.
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Table B.4: Dependent Variable: Individual Participation
Variable Model 4 Model 5
Gender 0.062
(0.059)
Age -0.012
(0.018)
Major -0.004
(0.007)
Subjective Returnst 0.027*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.008)
Subjective Returnst−1 -0.005
(0.004)
Actual Returnst−1 0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Actual Returnst−2 -0005
(0.004)
Past Positive Payofft 0.18*** 0.188***
(0.027) (0.029)
Past Negative Payofft 0.003 0.023
(0.03) (0.029)
Past Positive Payofft−1 0.062***
(0.023)
Past Negative Payofft−1 0.023
(0.023)
N 4704 4608
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.206
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B.0.3 Instructions
Overview
Welcome to this experiment in economic decision-making. Please read the instructions care-
fully as they explain how you earn money from the decisions you make in today’s experiment.
We ask that you not talk with one another and that you silence your phones. If you have
questions at any time please raise your hand and it will be answered in private. There will
be a short quiz following the reading of the instructions which you will all need to complete
before we can begin the session. Also, at the end of the last round, we will give you
a survey that pays you cash.
Today’s session will involve “rounds”. Each round will have 2 “tasks”: forecasting and
entry advice. For each task you will view some information and make decisions. You will
receive points for each task in each round. At the end of the session, we will randomly select
1 task. Your points from this task will be converted into dollars at 15 points = $1. Your
earnings from the task, the survey, and your $7 show-up payment will be given privately in
cash at the end of the session.
General Information
You are a financial advisor to an investment fund manager. The manager has 2 investment
options: a risk-free investment and a risky investment. The risk-free investment is putting
all the money into a bank account paying a fixed interest rate. The risky investment is
holding stocks which requires a transaction fee to buy. Your 2 tasks are:
1) Forecast the stock market price as accurately as possible and
2) Provide entry advice to the manager (hold the stock or not).
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To make the best decision, the manager needs to know what the stock price will be. As
the advisor, you have to predict the stock price (in francs) during 51 rounds and tell the
manager if he should buy the stock or not in each round.
Each manager has a different transaction fee for holding stocks. The transaction fees
are fixed per manager (e.g. each manager’s fee does not change in all rounds) and ranges
evenly from 0 to 4 francs per round (with no manager having a fee of 0). The manager
makes profits each round. If the manager does not buy stocks he makes 3 francs that round.
If he buys the stock, he makes uncertain profit: dividends which are 3 francs per round plus
a capital gain from stocks (which can be negative). Therefore good entry advice depends on
good forecasts. Your points depend on forecasting accuracy and the manager’s profits.
Market Information
The stock price is determined by equilibrium between the supply and demand of stocks. The
supply of stocks is fixed. The demand for stocks is mainly determined by the total demand
of a number of investment funds active in the stock market. Some of these funds are advised
by a participant in the experiment, others use a fixed strategy.
The more funds there are in the market, the higher the demand for stocks on average.
There is also 1 fund who will always enter the market. There is also some uncertain, small
demand for stocks by private investors but their effect on the stock price is small. Stock
prices are determined by equilibrium, that is, the stock price in round t will be the price
where total demand equals supply.
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Manager’s Investments Information
The exact investment strategy of your manager and the strategies of the other funds are
unknown. The risk-free bank account pays a fixed interest rate of 5% per round.
Stockholders receive a certain dividend of 3 francs per round. Stock returns per round
are uncertain and depend on dividends and stock price changes.
Based on your stock price forecast and entry decision, your manager will make an
optimal investment decision (e.g. some money into the bank account and some into stocks).
The higher your price forecast, the larger will be the fraction of money invested by your
manager in stocks, so the larger will be their demand for stocks. If you tell the manager not
to enter, then he invests everything in the risk-free bank account.
Task 1: Forecasting Prices
Your 1st task is to forecast the stock market price in each round as accurately as possible.
The stock price will always be between 0 and 100 francs. The stock price has to be predicted
both one and two rounds ahead. So at the start of each round you will make 2 stock price
predictions (e.g. this round and next). If the manager enters, he will use your two round
ahead forecast to make his optimal investment decision. Your forecasts can be made up to
2 decimal points.
At the start, you have to predict the stock price in the 1st two rounds, that is, you
have to give forecasts for rounds 1 and 2. After everyone has given their forecasts for the
1st two rounds, along with their entry advice, the stock price in round 1 will be revealed
and based on your forecasting error, your points for round 1 will be given. After that, you
have to give your forecast for rounds 2 and 3, along with entry advice for round 2. After
everyone has given their forecasts and entry advice in round 2, the stock price in round 2
will be revealed and based on your forecasting error and the manager’s profits, your earnings
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for round 2 will be given. This continues for 51 rounds.
It is important to note that you make 2 forecasts for each round’s price after round 1.
During round 1, you make a forecast of the stock price in round 2 and in round 2, you make
another forecast of the stock price in round 2. This is because at the start of round t, you
do not know the stock price in round t since it is revealed at the end of the round.
Task 2: Entry Advice for the Manager
Your 2nd task is to give entry advice. Your 2 choices are to enter the stock market or not
enter. The manager will follow your advice completely. The manager makes a profit based
on your decision. If the manager does not enter, the manager makes a service fee of 3 francs
that round. Otherwise, the manager makes a profit:
Pricet+1 + 3− 1.05 ∗ Pricet −Manager’s fee
where pricet is price in round t, 3 is the dividend, and 1.05 is the gross interest rate. Hence
his profits depend on the price change after entry (e.g. Pricet and Pricet+1).
Your job will be to make sure the manager makes the decision that maximizes his
per round profits. In each round, you will receive 3 points plus the manager’s profits if the
manager’s profits are positive (up to 5 points) and 3 points minus the manager’s profits if
they are negative (down to 1 point). If he does not enter, you will receive 3 points. The
following is a timeline of your tasks in each round:
Forecast p1
Forecast p2
Stage 1
Round 1
Enter or Not
Stage 2
Forecast p2
Forecast p3
Stage 1
Round 2
Enter or Not
Stage 2
...
...
Round t
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Points
Your points will depend on your forecasting accuracy and the manager’s profits. For fore-
casting, the better you predict the stock market price in each round, the more points you
get. Your points for forecasting are:
Forecast points in round t =
16
2 + |Price in round t− 1st forecast|+ |Price in round t− 2nd forecast|
where | · | is an absolute value (deviation), e.g. |10 − 13| = 3, |5 − 4| = 1. The accuracy
of both your 1st and 2nd forecast will matter. You can earn up to 8 points in each
round if you predict the stock price exactly both times.
Your points for entry are:
Entry points in round t =

min{3 +MP, 5} if entered in t-1 and pt + 3− 1.05pt−1 − ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager’s profits
≥ 0
max{3 +MP, 1} if entered in t-1 and pt + 3− 1.05pt−1 − ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager’s profits
< 0
3 if did not enter in t-1
where MP is the manager’s profits, pt is the price in round t, and ki is the manager’s trans-
action fee. And where max chooses the maximum value, e.g. max{3, 5} = 5 (min chooses
the minimum value). Hence the maximum points you can make is 5 and the minimum is
1. We will provide you with your manager’s expected profits based on your forecasts. Note
that entry points in round t depend on your entry choice in round t− 1. Remember we
will pick 1 task (forecasting or entry) at random to pay you at the end of the
experiment.
Forecasting Example: Suppose the price in round 7 was 70 francs and you guessed 65 in
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round 6 and 60 in round 7. Then your points:
16
2 + |70− 65|+ |70− 60| =
16
2 + 5 + 10
= 0.94 points
Entry Example: Suppose the price in round 8 was 80 francs and the price in round 7
was 70 francs and the manager’s transaction fee was 1. Then your points in round 8 if you
entered in round 7 would be:
80 + 3− 1.05 ∗ 70− 1 = 9.5 + 3 = 12.5 ≥ 5 =⇒ 5 points
If you did not enter, you would get 3 points. If it were negative you get less than 3 points.
The following is a table of possible points for forecasting. It is important to note
that the table does not give all values and that points are rounded to 2 decimal points.
Now please complete a short quiz. You can use the instructions sheet. Please raise your
hand when you are done and we will come around to check your answers. After everyone
has finished, we will let you know when you can begin the experiment.
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Question 1
What is the smallest and largest prices the stock can be?
Suppose you are at the beginning of round 10. Which rounds’ prices do you need to predict?
Question 2
If you advise your manager to enter, which forecast will your manager use to make his in-
vestment decision (1 or 2 rounds ahead)?
How much does the stock give in dividends (in francs) per round?
What is the interest rate that the bank account pays per round?
Question 3
What is the range of all manager’s transaction fees?
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What is the most amount of points you can earn for entry advice? What is the least
amount? How many points do you receive if you do not enter?
If you advise the manager to not enter the stock market, will he buy stocks?
Question 4
Suppose the price for round 20 is 50 francs. You guessed 45 in round 19 (for price in round
20) and 50 in round 20 (for price in round 20). How many points would you receive for
forecasting the price in round 20?
Suppose your manager’s profit in round 6 is 3. How many points would you earn? (Hint:
min{3 +MP, 5}). Suppose your manager’s profit in round 6 is -1. How many points would
you earn? (Hint: max{3 +MP, 1})
Suppose the price for round 21 is 55 francs and price for round 20 is 50 francs. Your
manager’s transaction fee is 1. If you entered in round 20, what is the manager’s profits?
How many points would you earn at the end of round 21? (Hint: pt + 3 − 1.05pt−1 − ki,
where ki is the manager’s transaction fee)
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
Here is list the analytical forms for the RPE. First let:
b = R−1
r =
EDtSt
ED2t
r˜ =
EDtSt
ES2t
Then the RPE is:
A1 = A2 = A3 =
µ− Saσ2p
R− 1
ψ = 1− bη + b(−ρ+ φbρφ− brρφr˜)n2 + b2ρφ(−1 + rr˜)n22 + bρn1(−1 + bφ+ bφ(−1 + rr˜))n2
B1 =
bρ(1− bφ+ b(−arσ2p + φ)n2)
ψ
B2 =
b(ρ− arσ2p − bρφ+ abrρσ2pn1 + bρφn2 − brρφr˜(−1 + n1 + n2))
ψ
C1 =
b(−bρφr˜(−1 + n1 + n2) + aσ2p(−1 + bρn1 + bρn2))
ψ
C3 =
b(aσ2p(−1 + bρn1 + bρn2)− ρr˜(−1 + bφn1 + abrσ2pn2))
ψ
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